I'm evaluating why they don't seem to care, not justifying it.

because they could be held accountable.

because it makes it easy to stovepipe sensitive information to Moscow, Beijing, et al.

because they're lazy and stupid.

and they're not justifying it because they don't have to, since there are not any meaningful consequences -- like jail or dismissal.

Signal is an official channel, and has been since the Biden administration.

Official channel for military operations ? I very much doubt it

You’re welcome to doubt it and the DoD have their own channels for internal communications but the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) in 2024 issued guidance suggesting Signal as a “best practice” for highly targeted government officials, so it’s used in situations that cut across many departments as well as external organisations like this.

People mistakenly believing that the issue is using Signal rather than simply accidentally adding a journalist is one of the major hallmarks of this case.

Isn't that recommendation for Signal in cases where they would otherwise use SMS? The aren't saying "use Signal for classified meetings" are they? They have their own apps for that.

It’s used on computers too.

—

“So that we’re clear, one of the first things that happened when I was confirmed as CIA director was Signal was loaded onto my computer at the CIA, as it is for most CIA officers,” Ratcliffe said. “One of the first things that I was briefed on very early, senator, by the CIA Records Management folks was the use of Signal as a permissible work use. It is. That is a practice that preceded the previous administration to the [former President Joe] Biden administration.”

You're continuing to skirt around the substance of the conversation: not for operationally sensitive or classified material.

Signal is used for things like "get to a SCIF to discuss" or "what do you want from Starbucks?"

It is not to be used for any non-public information:

> Unmanaged 'messaging apps,' including any app with a chat feature, regardless of the primary function, are NOT authorized to access, transmit, process non-public DoD information. This includes but is not limited to messaging, gaming, and social media apps. (i.e., iMessage, WhatsApps, Signal).

https://dodcio.defense.gov/Portals/0/Documents/Library/Memo-...

To me "permissible work use" at the CIA would be more than "what do you want from Starbucks?".

If you're at CIA, messaging a colleague at all is absolutely work use.

Sorry but it's clear that in addition to — again — skirting the substance of the conversation, your barometer for just how security-conscious these types of organizations are is completely out of whack.

I think somebody is avoiding responding to the point, but I don’t think it’s me. Your comment was written in response to somebody saying that Signal is mandatorily installed on desktops in the CIA, making the point that it is probably used for more purposes than ordering coffee.

If you think the CIA’s own SOE goes against the CIA’s own guidelines, then yes there is indeed somebody tremendously, fabulously, loudly ignorant about how securities conscious these organisations are. That’s not me either.

If you cannot comprehend the idea that work computers or phones can have software that is approved for one purpose, but not for others, then this discussion can't go anywhere.

If you work at a healthcare organization, you may have Slack, but that doesn't necessarily mean you can message people's PHI.

At a financial institution, you may have email, but that doesn't necessarily mean you can email PII.

At CIA, you may have Signal, but that doesn't mean you can discuss ongoing military operations in it.

I have already linked to policy that explicitly says non-public DoD information is not approved for Signal.

I find it literally not believable that you don't understand this concept, so I'll have to chalk this one up to motivated reasoning damaging your ability to interpret English.

The CISA guidance is advising that people use Signal for their general purpose communications, not for sharing details of military plans ahead of their execution.

You can read it here: https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2024-12/guidance-mo...