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Re:The Ethics of Spreading Life in the Cosmos by InsideOutSanta on Tuesday March 25, 2025 @03:36PM (#43474987)
Why?

Don't we reason about these things exactly to arrive at conclusions that go against our intuitions or feelings? If we decide that the reasoning is flawed merely because we don't like the conclusion, we might as well not reason at all.

Re:The Ethics of Spreading Life in the Cosmos by setsewerd on Tuesday March 25, 2025 @03:58PM (#43475227)
We reason these things not simply to contradict our feelings (though that is often a side effect), but to draw conclusions of how best to improve society and our species as a whole.

If human procreation is immoral simply because it creates suffering for "sentient" beings, then it's this particular line of ethics that needs to go extinct, rather than humanity itself.

"The rules we invented for ourselves say that we shouldn't continue existing" seems like a mindset that natural selection will handle by itself though.

Re:The Ethics of Spreading Life in the Cosmos by InsideOutSanta on Tuesday March 25, 2025 @04:15PM (#43475421)
>If human procreation is immoral simply because it creates suffering for "sentient" beings, then it's this particular line of ethics that needs to go extinct

You're not accurately describing the argument the linked article is making, but even so, is the argument you're making that creating suffering for sentient beings is not morally wrong?

>"The rules we invented for ourselves say that we shouldn't continue existing" seems like a mindset that natural selection will handle by itself though.

This is completely orthogonal to whether the argument is correct. Natural selection isn't moral; it just is.

Re:The Ethics of Spreading Life in the Cosmos by setsewerd on Tuesday March 25, 2025 @05:06PM (#43475977)
> You're not accurately describing the argument the linked article is making

Page quote: "Benatar's antinatalist philosophy: sentient beings are harmed when they are brought into existence, and it is therefore wrong to procreate."

The absolutism and anthropocentrism inherent in that statement renders his whole argument kind of silly. The existence of life itself is inevitably going to cause harm, regardless of how self-aware that particular life form is. It might be smaller degrees of harm, or more indirect, but harm nonetheless.

Sure we should try to minimize the harm we cause others, within reason, on a case-by-case basis, but if your best solution to that is self-imposed specicide, what is the point of ethics?

(Also the comment about natural selection was a half-joke, not a stance on the argument, but your final sentence seems to agree with me anyway.)

Re:The Ethics of Spreading Life in the Cosmos by InsideOutSanta on Wednesday March 26, 2025 @04:57AM (#43480165)
As far as I can ascertain, the argument being made in the article is this:

1. The absence of good is not bad because nobody is around to lament it

2. The existence of bad is bad

In other words, because it doesn't yet exist, you can't hurt a being by not bringing it into existence. You can't hurt non-existent beings. But you can hurt a being by bringing it into existence because it can and will be harmed once it exists.

The argument is not "simply because it creates suffering for sentient beings."

If you disagree with the argument, you have to explain why it is incorrect. In particular, why is the absence of good bad even if nobody is around to experience that absence? This is difficult to argue, in my opinion, even if I subjectively feel like it has to be wrong.

One argument I can think of is that we want to maximize the average goodness, so we should bring conscious beings into existence if we expect them to experience more good than bad. However, philosophers don't tend to make that argument because the implications are horrific.

Re:The Ethics of Spreading Life in the Cosmos by ycombinete on Tuesday March 25, 2025 @03:46PM (#43475090)
Agreed. Bertrand Russel wrote of the Sophist Georgias, “We do not know what his arguments were, but I can well imagine that they had a logical force which compelled his opponents to take refuge in edification.”

Positions that make me feel indignant, or viscerally repulsed, are often ones that I simultaneously don’t like and also have no argument against. (Moral Relativism, for example.)

Re:The Ethics of Spreading Life in the Cosmos by DennisP on Tuesday March 25, 2025 @04:34PM (#43475645)
If reasoning is based on verifiable facts and logic, sure. But in this case, the starting point for his reasoning appears to be our own intuitions and feelings:

"The reason why we do not lament our failure to bring somebody into existence is because absent pleasures are not bad."

But we also don't lament bringing somebody into existence; in fact we tend to celebrate it. So we could just as well conclude that absent pleasures really are bad, or turn it around and say that pleasurable existence is good.

Re:The Ethics of Spreading Life in the Cosmos by InsideOutSanta on Wednesday March 26, 2025 @04:59AM (#43480181)
Why do you think this statement is based on feelings? It seems axiomatic. Non-existent beings can't be harmed.
Re:The Ethics of Spreading Life in the Cosmos by DennisP on Wednesday March 26, 2025 @12:23PM (#43483904)
But that wasn't the statement. The statement was that "absent pleasures are not bad." Whether something is good or bad is a value judgement, just like "procreation is bad" (or good).

I countered with another value judgment: "pleasurable existence is good." This seems trivially true as well but Benatar ignores it. Whether the good of existence outweighs the bad of existence is yet another value judgment, and also depends on particular experience.

Re:The Ethics of Spreading Life in the Cosmos by InsideOutSanta on Wednesday March 26, 2025 @03:20PM (#43485928)
The point is that a person who isn't born cannot make a value judgment about whether something is bad.
Re:The Ethics of Spreading Life in the Cosmos by DennisP on Wednesday March 26, 2025 @03:58PM (#43486475)
Nor can they make a judgement about whether the good outweighs the bad. So that's up to us. I'm saying it makes no sense to make that decision solely based on the bad while ignoring all that's good; if you do, then of course it follows that it's bad to procreate, but that's because you left out half of the equation.

In my personal life, I feel that the good far outweighs the bad, and existence is far better than nonexistence. So it doesn't make sense to me to assume that another person who doesn't happen to exist yet won't feel the same way.

Re:The Ethics of Spreading Life in the Cosmos by InsideOutSanta on Wednesday March 26, 2025 @04:33PM (#43486975)
>I'm saying it makes no sense to make that decision solely based on the bad while ignoring all that's good

They're not ignoring the good, they're arguing that an absence of good is not bad. You seem to be arguing that an absence of good is bad because there is a potential positive experience that could exist if a person came into existence and could experience it.

But their point is that the person who would have that experience does not yet exist and thus is not harmed by not coming into existence and not having that positive experience.

Re:The Ethics of Spreading Life in the Cosmos by DennisP on Thursday March 27, 2025 @01:26PM (#43495802)
You could just as well say that killing someone is not bad, because after you kill them they will not experience any lack of positive experience.
Re:The Ethics of Spreading Life in the Cosmos by InsideOutSanta on Friday March 28, 2025 @03:10PM (#43508957)
The person is alive when you kill them, but yes, I think it's not unusual to think that somebody's death doesn't particularly bother the dead person but everybody around them.
Re:The Ethics of Spreading Life in the Cosmos by DennisP on Friday March 28, 2025 @06:30PM (#43510528)
So that would mean it's perfectly fine to sneak up behind a happy hermit and shoot them in the head. In fact, it's the best thing to do. They wouldn't suffer, they'd never know what they're missing, and they wouldn't experience anything bad anymore. I think most people would agree that an ethical argument with that result has something wrong with it.
Re:The Ethics of Spreading Life in the Cosmos by InsideOutSanta on Saturday March 29, 2025 @06:54AM (#43514437)
Yes, I also intuitively agree. But now explain to me what is wrong with it.
Re:The Ethics of Spreading Life in the Cosmos by DennisP on Saturday March 29, 2025 @10:16AM (#43515738)
I think I already did but let me try a slightly different angle.

If a conscious person has a bad experience, Benatar considers that Bad in some absolute sense. He thinks it's important that we reduce the number of bad experiences in the world.

Benatar does not consider conscious existence itself to have any particular value. It doesn't matter whether there are more total experiences in the world.

He also doesn't consider good experiences to be Good in any absolute sense, but just privately good to the person experiencing them. So we shouldn't care about increasing the number of good experiences in the world. Given that someone exists, maybe we should help that person have more good experiences, but it's no absolute loss if that person disappears and any good experiences with them.

These are all value judgements: that conscious experience has no intrinsic value, and that we should reduce total bad experiences but not care about total good experiences. The asymmetric treatment of good and bad experiences, and the lack of value attached to existence itself, trivially lead to his odd conclusion. Most people disagree with his conclusion not because they're illogical, but because if they looked closely then they'd disagree with his premises. I would say that conscious existence is intrinsically good, even if it contains some bad experiences. I'd also say that it really is good to have more total good experiences in the world, just as it is bad to have more bad experiences.

As I sit here on the floor in a slightly awkward position, I have a small pain in my hip. Since Benatar doesn't place any value on existence itself, to be consistent he'd have to argue that it'd better for me if a sniper blew up my head, than if I continued to have this little pain in my hip. This is a value judgment with which I disagree.

Re:The Ethics of Spreading Life in the Cosmos by InsideOutSanta on Sunday March 30, 2025 @06:18AM (#43522957)
My problem is that I agree with everything you say, but I can't make a logical argument for it.

I also think that conscious existence is intrinsically good, that it is amazing that the universe has found a way to experience itself, and that out of thoughtless rocks, qualia have arisen.

But I don't understand how to argue why this is so. In fact, it appears to make no sense. It seems to me that the only argument one could make that conscious existence is good is that there are conscious people who believe it is good, and without those people, the argument ceases to make sense.

"I'd also say that it really is good to have more total good experiences in the world, just as it is bad to have more bad experiences."

Philosophers do not make this specific argument because if you treat good and bad symmetrically, you can reach conclusions like "slavery is good if it produces more good than bad."

Of course, this is also an outcome-driven decision, where people dismiss an argument because they don't like the logical conclusion, but I think it's fair to say that "good" and "bad" aren't the same thing in opposite directions.

Re:The Ethics of Spreading Life in the Cosmos by DennisP on Sunday March 30, 2025 @04:10PM (#43527192)
This is a more interesting discussion than I expected at first. Anyway...

If you can't find a rational argument that conscious experience is good, can you find one that says bad experiences are bad?

If "the only argument one could make that conscious existence is good is that there are conscious people who believe it is good," well doesn't that also apply to bad experiences? The only argument one could make that they're bad is that there are conscious people who believe they are bad. If that's not a sufficient argument, then why bother with reducing bad experiences at all?

And if conscious existence itself doesn't matter then it's hard to see any reason why it should matter what sort of experiences conscious beings have. Whether there are lots of them or few, whether they have good or experiences or bad, none of it matters, any more than it matters what sort of chemical reactions happen as atoms bounce around on lifeless planets.

On the other hand if we decide we should take into account the preferences of conscious beings, then we should consider that they prefer to exist.

Regarding your second argument, you've alluded to an issue already. You say we can't count total good experiences because that leads to bad consequences. But Benetar's premises lead to even worse consequences. So why shouldn't we discount his approach as well?

We should argue on a level playing field. If we use some criteria to reject an argument against Benatar, we shouldn't give Benatar a pass on that same criteria.

I do agree we shouldn't simply count good vs. bad and choose the maximum total good. But that doesn't mean we should discount good experiences entirely. It's still good to have more good experiences in the world, even if we have to be careful about how we apply that principle.

Ultimately, maybe we have to take the most basic things on faith, if we want to avoid utter nihilism. Even math doesn't prove everything; every kind of mathematics starts with a handful of unproven axioms and works out the consequences.

Re:The Ethics of Spreading Life in the Cosmos by phkahler on Tuesday March 25, 2025 @06:42PM (#43476840)
>> Why

Because that notion is stupid on its face. If there is an ethical code that transcends human existence then nature itself violated that code by letting life evolve into humans. If some jackass wants to claim to know better than the forces of nature well... I'm not sure what else to say about that.

Re:The Ethics of Spreading Life in the Cosmos by InsideOutSanta on Wednesday March 26, 2025 @04:12AM (#43479947)
Nature doesn't care about ethics.