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Re:The Ethics of Spreading Life in the Cosmos by DennisP on Wednesday March 26, 2025 @12:23PM (#43483904)
But that wasn't the statement. The statement was that "absent pleasures are not bad." Whether something is good or bad is a value judgement, just like "procreation is bad" (or good).

I countered with another value judgment: "pleasurable existence is good." This seems trivially true as well but Benatar ignores it. Whether the good of existence outweighs the bad of existence is yet another value judgment, and also depends on particular experience.

Re:The Ethics of Spreading Life in the Cosmos by InsideOutSanta on Wednesday March 26, 2025 @03:20PM (#43485928)
The point is that a person who isn't born cannot make a value judgment about whether something is bad.
Re:The Ethics of Spreading Life in the Cosmos by DennisP on Wednesday March 26, 2025 @03:58PM (#43486475)
Nor can they make a judgement about whether the good outweighs the bad. So that's up to us. I'm saying it makes no sense to make that decision solely based on the bad while ignoring all that's good; if you do, then of course it follows that it's bad to procreate, but that's because you left out half of the equation.

In my personal life, I feel that the good far outweighs the bad, and existence is far better than nonexistence. So it doesn't make sense to me to assume that another person who doesn't happen to exist yet won't feel the same way.

Re:The Ethics of Spreading Life in the Cosmos by InsideOutSanta on Wednesday March 26, 2025 @04:33PM (#43486975)
>I'm saying it makes no sense to make that decision solely based on the bad while ignoring all that's good

They're not ignoring the good, they're arguing that an absence of good is not bad. You seem to be arguing that an absence of good is bad because there is a potential positive experience that could exist if a person came into existence and could experience it.

But their point is that the person who would have that experience does not yet exist and thus is not harmed by not coming into existence and not having that positive experience.

Re:The Ethics of Spreading Life in the Cosmos by DennisP on Thursday March 27, 2025 @01:26PM (#43495802)
You could just as well say that killing someone is not bad, because after you kill them they will not experience any lack of positive experience.
Re:The Ethics of Spreading Life in the Cosmos by InsideOutSanta on Friday March 28, 2025 @03:10PM (#43508957)
The person is alive when you kill them, but yes, I think it's not unusual to think that somebody's death doesn't particularly bother the dead person but everybody around them.
Re:The Ethics of Spreading Life in the Cosmos by DennisP on Friday March 28, 2025 @06:30PM (#43510528)
So that would mean it's perfectly fine to sneak up behind a happy hermit and shoot them in the head. In fact, it's the best thing to do. They wouldn't suffer, they'd never know what they're missing, and they wouldn't experience anything bad anymore. I think most people would agree that an ethical argument with that result has something wrong with it.
Re:The Ethics of Spreading Life in the Cosmos by InsideOutSanta on Saturday March 29, 2025 @06:54AM (#43514437)
Yes, I also intuitively agree. But now explain to me what is wrong with it.
Re:The Ethics of Spreading Life in the Cosmos by DennisP on Saturday March 29, 2025 @10:16AM (#43515738)
I think I already did but let me try a slightly different angle.

If a conscious person has a bad experience, Benatar considers that Bad in some absolute sense. He thinks it's important that we reduce the number of bad experiences in the world.

Benatar does not consider conscious existence itself to have any particular value. It doesn't matter whether there are more total experiences in the world.

He also doesn't consider good experiences to be Good in any absolute sense, but just privately good to the person experiencing them. So we shouldn't care about increasing the number of good experiences in the world. Given that someone exists, maybe we should help that person have more good experiences, but it's no absolute loss if that person disappears and any good experiences with them.

These are all value judgements: that conscious experience has no intrinsic value, and that we should reduce total bad experiences but not care about total good experiences. The asymmetric treatment of good and bad experiences, and the lack of value attached to existence itself, trivially lead to his odd conclusion. Most people disagree with his conclusion not because they're illogical, but because if they looked closely then they'd disagree with his premises. I would say that conscious existence is intrinsically good, even if it contains some bad experiences. I'd also say that it really is good to have more total good experiences in the world, just as it is bad to have more bad experiences.

As I sit here on the floor in a slightly awkward position, I have a small pain in my hip. Since Benatar doesn't place any value on existence itself, to be consistent he'd have to argue that it'd better for me if a sniper blew up my head, than if I continued to have this little pain in my hip. This is a value judgment with which I disagree.

Re:The Ethics of Spreading Life in the Cosmos by InsideOutSanta on Sunday March 30, 2025 @06:18AM (#43522957)
My problem is that I agree with everything you say, but I can't make a logical argument for it.

I also think that conscious existence is intrinsically good, that it is amazing that the universe has found a way to experience itself, and that out of thoughtless rocks, qualia have arisen.

But I don't understand how to argue why this is so. In fact, it appears to make no sense. It seems to me that the only argument one could make that conscious existence is good is that there are conscious people who believe it is good, and without those people, the argument ceases to make sense.

"I'd also say that it really is good to have more total good experiences in the world, just as it is bad to have more bad experiences."

Philosophers do not make this specific argument because if you treat good and bad symmetrically, you can reach conclusions like "slavery is good if it produces more good than bad."

Of course, this is also an outcome-driven decision, where people dismiss an argument because they don't like the logical conclusion, but I think it's fair to say that "good" and "bad" aren't the same thing in opposite directions.

Re:The Ethics of Spreading Life in the Cosmos by DennisP on Sunday March 30, 2025 @04:10PM (#43527192)
This is a more interesting discussion than I expected at first. Anyway...

If you can't find a rational argument that conscious experience is good, can you find one that says bad experiences are bad?

If "the only argument one could make that conscious existence is good is that there are conscious people who believe it is good," well doesn't that also apply to bad experiences? The only argument one could make that they're bad is that there are conscious people who believe they are bad. If that's not a sufficient argument, then why bother with reducing bad experiences at all?

And if conscious existence itself doesn't matter then it's hard to see any reason why it should matter what sort of experiences conscious beings have. Whether there are lots of them or few, whether they have good or experiences or bad, none of it matters, any more than it matters what sort of chemical reactions happen as atoms bounce around on lifeless planets.

On the other hand if we decide we should take into account the preferences of conscious beings, then we should consider that they prefer to exist.

Regarding your second argument, you've alluded to an issue already. You say we can't count total good experiences because that leads to bad consequences. But Benetar's premises lead to even worse consequences. So why shouldn't we discount his approach as well?

We should argue on a level playing field. If we use some criteria to reject an argument against Benatar, we shouldn't give Benatar a pass on that same criteria.

I do agree we shouldn't simply count good vs. bad and choose the maximum total good. But that doesn't mean we should discount good experiences entirely. It's still good to have more good experiences in the world, even if we have to be careful about how we apply that principle.

Ultimately, maybe we have to take the most basic things on faith, if we want to avoid utter nihilism. Even math doesn't prove everything; every kind of mathematics starts with a handful of unproven axioms and works out the consequences.