oh, cogito existo sum! checkmate theists!
dude, the simulation hypothesis does not mean things don't exist, it means they don't necessarily exist in the way you have, rather unimaginatively, imagined, and you have no way to tell.
and Occam's Razor does not solve the problem.
also, falsifiability lacks falsifiability.
don't make up complex axioms and then believe in them on faith.
Occam's razor: if the universe can be simulated, then whatever form the simulation takes is the simpler explanation for the turtles all the way down.
if the universe can't be simulated, explain how you know that.
To pull from the relevant part of Hofstadter’s incredible I am a Strange Loop (a book also happens to more rigorously invoke Gödel for cognitive science):
And this is our central quandary. Either we believe in a nonmaterial soul that lives outside the laws of physics, which amounts to a nonscientific belief in magic, or we reject that idea, in which case the eternally beckoning question "What could ever make a mere physical pattern be me?”
After all, a phrase like "physical system" or "physical substrate" brings to mind for most people… an intricate structure consisting of vast numbers of interlocked wheels, gears, rods, tubes, balls, pendula, and so forth, even if they are tiny, invisible, perfectly silent, and possibly even probabilistic. Such an array of interacting inanimate stuff seems to most people as unconscious and devoid of inner light as a flush toilet, an automobile transmission, a fancy Swiss watch (mechanical or electronic), a cog railway, an ocean liner, or an oil refinery. Such a system is not just probably unconscious, it is *necessarily* so, as they see it. This is the kind of single-level intuition so skillfully exploited by John Searle in his attempts to convince people that computers could never be conscious, no matter what abstract patterns might reside in them, and could never mean anything at all by whatever long chains of lexical items they might string together.
Highly recommend it for anyone who liked Gödel, Escher, Bach, but wants more explicit scientific theses! He basically wrote it to clarify the more artsy/rhetorical points made in the former book.It's accurate. But it feels really weird.
It's not uncommon for great scientists to be totally out of their depth even in nearby fields, and not realize it. But this isn't the hard part of either computability or philosophy of mind.
Penrose is an authority in some fields of theoretical physics, but that doesn't give any value to what he has to say on consciousness or AI.
On that topic, he has clearly adopted an unscientific approach: he wants to believe the soul exists and is immaterial and seeks evidence for it.
Simultaneously, actual dualists flock to his theories because they think association with Penrose lends credibility to their religious stuff.