In practice, the move only added uncertainty for black. White faced easy choices, and black difficult ones.
I didn't disagree that Fisher thought the move was safe and miscalculated. Indeed, he didn't even miscalculate badly-- engines think they can hold the position.
I'm asserting that the move fails because it made the subsequent game more complicated for Fisher without imposing an equal penalty on his opponent. It made a bad miscalculation almost inevitable.
This is not something Black wants to do in matchplay chess in general. Usually he would be happy with a sterile draw and hope to take advantage of having an extra white in the remaining games.
Fischer, on the other hand, liked to play for a win in every game. And IIRC this match gave the defending champion draw odds, so the challenger had more incentive than normal to take risks, even in game 1.
Still, I generally agree with the analysis of Kasparov etc in this position. Fischer didn't miss the game continuation and he didn't assess the piece-down position as offering Black his share of winning chances. He more likely missed that after Bxh2 g3 h5 Ke2 h4 Kf3 h3 Kg4 Bg1 Kxh3 Bxf2 Bd2! White still traps the bishop.
If on move 29, you choose a move that is slightly worse but leave yourself in an extremely difficult position for you but an easy one for the other guy...
And then only on move 40 does the eval extremely diverge...
In my opinion, your real blunder was on move 29, not 40. Just because an engine could hold a position doesn't make it a reasonable move.