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Re:Reviewing the Cryptography Used by Signal by some_furry on Tuesday February 18, 2025 @03:25PM (#43094587)
I should be more precise:

Signal's server doesn't know who sent the message, since that information was Sealed.

Signal's server does know where to deliver the message to, based on a 96-bit random value generated client-side by the recipient (the delivery token). But it cannot know which user has which delivery token. To understand that, you need to look at the zero-knowledge credentials section of the code.

They could randomly drop messages sent to a specific targeted user's delivery token and block messages sent to that targeted user, but they have no way of knowing which user they're targeting. (Also, the client could just enroll a new one if this ever happened and Signal was somehow court-ordered to block delivery to a specific delivery token.)

Re:Reviewing the Cryptography Used by Signal by grayhatter on Tuesday February 18, 2025 @03:28PM (#43094644)
Is signal not able to tag and reduce the sealed envelope to a "final" destination network address?

I.e. is a sender able to prove that it's impossible for signal servers to do this?

Re:Reviewing the Cryptography Used by Signal by some_furry on Tuesday February 18, 2025 @03:30PM (#43094658)
I don't understand your question.

See https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/ and https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1416 if you'd like descriptions for the protocols I'm trying to describe in HN comments.