That is a huge assumption we just have no way of knowing. For starters, we don't know whether we are in an atemporal "frozen" state or not.
My take: Epistemology is metaphysical bs, and “truth” is a convention we agree to within communities of speakers.
It's reasonable to assume, and so allow us to talk about the passage of time even though we have no conclusive evidence for it, but that does not make it reasonable to claim conscioussness requires a dynamic system, because we don't know and can't know, only act as if it does.
Panpsychic "everything is alive" is better than "nothing else is conscious because I'm not them", but only by one degree.
> Where does it hurt?
Pokes leg, ow
Pokes arm, ow
Pokes stomach, ow
> Everywhere!
> I think you sprained your finger
From the article, emphasis mine: "But we should not be looking for a homunculus in physical systems to serve as a subject. *The subject is the whole system*, or better, is associated with the system in the way that a subject is associated with a brain."
Is this dualism because it retains the idea of the subject at all? But Chalmers states "the subject is the system", and so seems to reject the notion of mind/body duality. I haven't read about this in much depth, so I don't have a very sophisticated understanding here.
There is no atemporal “frozen” state we can call consciousness. It is dynamic.
That is what bothers me about the Chalmer’s piece. There are not three states of a thermostat’s “What’s it like”. He is showboating his writting chops and parroting Nagel’s dualism.