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Re:What Is It Like To Be A Thermostat? by Trasmatta on Monday December 30, 2024 @09:17AM (#42549436)
> However, the entire discussion about what consciousness is, strikes me as less interesting. Is this really more than being able to conjure up memories of past experiences?

I don't think memory and consciousness are intrinsically linked. Memory is something consciousness can be aware of, but it's not consciousness itself. Someone can have their ability to process and remember memories permanently or temporarily damaged, and yet still have a conscious experience. An AI can have memory, but not have a conscious experience. (Or at least it seems that way - if something like Integrated Information Theory is true, then maybe AI does have some sort of first person conscious experience. I tend to doubt that, but I could be wrong.)

EDIT: although I might be conflating short term and long term memory. I wonder if consciousness requires at LEAST some form of memory processing, even if it's just the past couple of seconds. Perhaps the "Strange Loop" needs at least that to arise. I'm not sure.

Re:What Is It Like To Be A Thermostat? by robwwilliams on Monday December 30, 2024 @10:16AM (#42550002)
Yes, consciousness requires some embedding in time (duration). It requires a capacity of recursion. Hofstadter’s stance loop is a temporal process.

There is no atemporal “frozen” state we can call consciousness. It is dynamic.

That is what bothers me about the Chalmer’s piece. There are not three states of a thermostat’s “What’s it like”. He is showboating his writting chops and parroting Nagel’s dualism.

Re:What Is It Like To Be A Thermostat? by vidarh on Monday December 30, 2024 @10:37AM (#42550195)
> There is no atemporal “frozen” state we can call consciousness. It is dynamic.

That is a huge assumption we just have no way of knowing. For starters, we don't know whether we are in an atemporal "frozen" state or not.

Re:What Is It Like To Be A Thermostat? by robwwilliams on Monday December 30, 2024 @02:01PM (#42552370)
It is a highly pragmatic assumption like absolutely everything else, even cogito ergo sum. Tell me what is not an assumption and then maybe we can talk.

My take: Epistemology is metaphysical bs, and “truth” is a convention we agree to within communities of speakers.

Re:What Is It Like To Be A Thermostat? by vidarh on Tuesday December 31, 2024 @08:00AM (#42558437)
As an axiom for discussing our observable world, sure, it's pragmatic. But it remains an assumption. I wouldn't dream of suggesting cogito ergo sum isn't an assumption. On the contrary, it's a very shaky assumption. The passage of time is a more reasonable one, but it's still one we have no evidence for.

It's reasonable to assume, and so allow us to talk about the passage of time even though we have no conclusive evidence for it, but that does not make it reasonable to claim conscioussness requires a dynamic system, because we don't know and can't know, only act as if it does.

Re:What Is It Like To Be A Thermostat? by sdwr on Monday December 30, 2024 @04:31PM (#42553791)
Thank you for bringing some sense into the conversation.

Panpsychic "everything is alive" is better than "nothing else is conscious because I'm not them", but only by one degree.

> Where does it hurt?

Pokes leg, ow

Pokes arm, ow

Pokes stomach, ow

> Everywhere!

> I think you sprained your finger

Re:What Is It Like To Be A Thermostat? by bglazer on Monday December 30, 2024 @04:43PM (#42553882)
What do you mean by dualism?

From the article, emphasis mine: "But we should not be looking for a homunculus in physical systems to serve as a subject. *The subject is the whole system*, or better, is associated with the system in the way that a subject is associated with a brain."

Is this dualism because it retains the idea of the subject at all? But Chalmers states "the subject is the system", and so seems to reject the notion of mind/body duality. I haven't read about this in much depth, so I don't have a very sophisticated understanding here.