In the same way, there was a fixed pot of money available split up by popularity, so making thousands of songs and streaming them as much as possible with bot accounts is profitable, even though each bot account cost a few dollars per month.
Here, the bots you use to juice your numbers don’t even need a subscription fee!
That would eliminate direct financial payment from botting. But botting could still affect trending or “related” recommendations for indirect financial boost.
The real mystery is why it should work any differently, because the cross subsidy seemingly creates a perverse profit incentive for bots to scalp off some of that cross subsidy. The economics are broken. This is socialism for the rich and popular.
In one case, 10 plays brought in $10 of revenue to Spotify, and those 10 plays should get $PERCENT of that $10.
In the other case, 1000 plays brought in $10 of revenue to Spotify, and those 1000 plays should also get the same $PERCENT of that $10.
Also, since they didn't change the economics, they have done nothing to prevent this from happening again. Any economist that sees that he can earn $12 from a $11 payment would keep doing this until the risk adjusted return is equal to the interest rate. Ironically this will remain profitable until the cross subsidy is gone. I.e. there is an incentive to use the bots to boost real musicians who lose out from not being the recipient of the cross subsidy.
It's true that the metrics used in this story could lead to being exploited. But the value of the initiative is not in the specific method used to donate, but in the idea of finding worthy yet non-obvious projects to donate and in leading by example.
If the initiative catches on, the community can find better, harder-to-exploit methods to find deserving targets, as for example it has happend with NGOs. This idea could create a healthy ecosystem that supports FLOSS software, just like the idea of a stock exchange supported the emergence of public traded corporations in the XVIII and XIX centuries.
The current algorithm is far from being perfect (it's an MVP) and will never be, but with more measurable inputs and after multiple iterations with the help of the community, it can lead to an analogue of "S&P500" for OSS, that's worth using for donating to reduce the risk of the global OSS supply chain we all rely on.
As with publicly traded companies, having a decentralized set of private donors with skin in the game helps a lot to efficiently evolve the approach and make it harder to exploit in the future. And on the contrary, I would not trust an algorithm created and maintained by some state-owned or simply very large institution.
If there were an "Open 500" that was trying to be like the open equivalent to the S&P 500, I would happily donate to it. Right now I do GitHub sponsors but it feels kind of random.
You just don't want to include projects like React or TypeScript that are operated by a for-profit company - they don't need our donations. You want it to be, this money is actually going to an organization that will invest it in software quality.
In a nutshell:
- Algorithmic does not always mean automatic. An algorithm can have a human-in-the-loop element, as S&P500 or NASDAQ Composite have.
- Future versions of the index will account for known funding of OSS owners and maybe even exclude well-funded companies.
Set arbitrary metrics like download count -> bad actors make bots to download their package -> they profit while the registry suffers from very heavy load.
While I applaud the OP for the initiative, if this ever takes off it will cause people to exploit the system in the following ways:
1. Hammer the package registries with fake downloads, which will increase the financial burden on the registries both in terms of increased resource usage and in employing countermeasures to stop bad actors.
2. People spamming the repositories of popular packages with PRs that just so happen to add a dependency on their own personal package, so that they can pick up transitive downloads. This increases the burden on package authors who will need to spend time rejecting all of these.
So this approach carries the risk of possibly making things even worse for OSS maintainers.
If a metric can be gamed, and there is a financial incentive to game it, it will be gamed. I coin this the "this is why we can't have nice things" law.