Re:Hyperlight: Virtual machine-based security for functions ...
by zekrioca on Saturday November 09, 2024 @04:14AM
(#42093402)
Why couldn’t one mathematically recreate the limitations of a VM through a namespace by means of SELinux?
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Re:Hyperlight: Virtual machine-based security for functions ...
by kevincox on Sunday November 10, 2024 @06:34AM
(#42099665)
Because the Linux kernel is incredibly complicated and shouldn't be trusted as a strong security boundary. A simple hypervisor likes has far fewer vulnerabilities so is an easier to trust boundary. They are in very different security tiers.
I would summarize as containers are good for mostly trusted isolation (teams within a company, purchased software) VMs are good for general untrusted software (different tenants in a cloud provider) and separate physical hardware is for scenarios where attacks are likely (military, known malicious code). Of course use cases are very fuzzy, but I wouldn't run fully untrusted code in the same kernel as anything of value.