Isn't most data in the cloud heavily distributed and broken into shards across many racks and drives and such? And encrypted so is useless outside of the custom block storage system employed by the cloud provider?
They would need to decrypt and assemble the shards to get usable data out.
I have no clue how they would even know which drives out the tens of thousands to grab, and they would also have other customer's data on them.
https://leb.fbi.gov/articles/featured-articles/executing-sea...
Or in China, just take the entire data center. https://www.theregister.com/2018/01/11/icloud_china_goes_to_...
And its sad to see the atrocious quality of the BBC article. Even high school students learn that a journalistic piece, should make sure it touches the Five Ws of good journalism...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Five_Ws
The Hollywood Reporter has much better quality reporting including context: https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/business/business-news/net...
Plus you can engage in some jurisdiction arbitrage where all the documents pertaining to country A is stored in country B, and all the documents pertaining to country B is stored in country A.
> Second are they really going to raid and take the drives at an AWS data center that has other customer’s information?
You can also ask AWS to produce the files/documents for you.
Not an AWS expert but how does that even work? Does AWS connect to your HSM remotely? Or is a cloud HSM that's also hosted by AWS?
I actually was imprecise with my wording.
A customer managed KMS key is any key that you make instead of using an AWS provided key. AWS still has the means to theoretically decrypt the data.
I am actually referring to a customer managed KMS key where you import your own key material
https://docs.aws.amazon.com/kms/latest/developerguide/import...
There is also CloudHSM
https://aws.amazon.com/cloudhsm/faqs/#:~:text=AWS%20CloudHSM....
I don’t know how far “AWS doesn’t have access to your keys go” when it comes to a government subpoena.
I do know that if anyone accesses anything on your account from AWS, all sorts of internal alarm bells go off at AWS and it would still show up in your CloudTrail logs.
I’m sure there is something that allows internal AWS employees to access your account in unauthorized ways. But I never heard about it in 3.5 years working there in the Professional Services department.
Sounds like it would make it easier for law enforcement. They no longer need a warrant against/for the company they're investigating, just the place where their data is stored. Get the warrant, raid the place and grab the drives, then continue the investigation. Done the right way, the company under investigation wouldn't even notice it.