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Re:Okta – Username Above 52 Characters Security Advisory by fanf2 on Friday November 01, 2024 @09:39PM (#42023381)
The salt is a separate input to the algorithm that is used differently and usually more restricted than the password.
Re:Okta – Username Above 52 Characters Security Advisory by njtransit on Friday November 01, 2024 @10:05PM (#42023523)
The goal of a salt is to prevent lookup attacks. Since the user id is unique to each user, it prevents the use of pre-computed lookup tables like a salt would.
Re:Okta – Username Above 52 Characters Security Advisory by heliosyne on Saturday November 02, 2024 @01:14AM (#42024208)
The security of salting is twofold. Yes, it defeats the common rainbow table. But if the salt is known, a rainbow table for that salt can be computed. The security of salting depends on the salt being unknown.

If the salt is externally known, which the username and userID necessarily are, then the rainbow table for that account can be computed entirely offline, defeating the point of salting.

Re:Okta – Username Above 52 Characters Security Advisory by lmz on Saturday November 02, 2024 @01:24AM (#42024239)
No. Such a rainbow table is per-username and non reusable. Which is the point of salting.
Re:Okta – Username Above 52 Characters Security Advisory by heliosyne on Saturday November 02, 2024 @02:08AM (#42024359)
No, rainbow tables are hash-input specific. They're user-specific only if the salt is user-unique. Usernames aren't normally part of the hash input because they're assumed-public knowledge.

You can test this for yourself by creating a user account, then editing the master password database and manually changing the username without recalculating the password hash. The password will still work. If the username was part of the hash input, the password would fail.

Re:Okta – Username Above 52 Characters Security Advisory by lmz on Saturday November 02, 2024 @05:10AM (#42025065)
You complained about them salting using the public username as salt. You asserted that this makes the rainbow table computable offline. I asserted that this didn't matter much for security since the table for H(username || secret) is username specific and not reusable for other usernames. Since precomputed rainbow tables consume quite a bit of space it is rather unlikely that anyone would have such a table stored for any random username.
Re:Okta – Username Above 52 Characters Security Advisory by heliosyne on Saturday November 02, 2024 @07:09AM (#42025615)
I didn't complain about anyone. The Okta vulnerability isn't because of public salts.
Re:Okta – Username Above 52 Characters Security Advisory by vlovich123 on Saturday November 02, 2024 @11:42AM (#42027048)
You can still build a rainbow table for a specific username if you want to do a targeted attack.
Re:Okta – Username Above 52 Characters Security Advisory by MattPalmer1086 on Saturday November 02, 2024 @06:46AM (#42025487)
The primary purpose of salting is to prevent precomputation being used to attack all users (e.g. rainbow tables). Even when specific salts are known they have already done this job.

Salts are not intended to be secrets.

If you want to treat a salt as if it was a private key, that would only provide additional protection for the very specific circumstance where the user hash is compromised, but the corresponding salt was not.

Re:Okta – Username Above 52 Characters Security Advisory by chiph on Saturday November 02, 2024 @10:27AM (#42026585)
You're both right, but are coming at this from different directions. In the past a rainbow table was intended to reveal as many passwords on a system as possible once you got a copy of the passwords. If one of them happened to be a high-value account, great. But maybe access to an ordinary account is good enough for their (nefarious) purposes.

It's also possible to build a rainbow table when you already know an account is high-value and have the salt. You can't go download that rainbow table - you'll have to compute it yourself, so the cost to the attacker is higher. But if the account is valuable enough to justify targeting specifically, you'll do it.

Re:Okta – Username Above 52 Characters Security Advisory by notpushkin on Saturday November 02, 2024 @11:22AM (#42026920)
> then the rainbow table for that account can be computed entirely offline

So you basically bruteforce the password for a specific account before you get the actual hash but after you know the hashing scheme? I don’t see how this helps with any sort of attack though.

Re:Okta – Username Above 52 Characters Security Advisory by marginalia_nu on Friday November 01, 2024 @10:25PM (#42023613)
That's fair.

Though you can salt a hash using a function that does not take a distinct salt input by just concatenating the salt with the value. This is a relatively common practice, but of course only works if there is no truncation of the salted input.