heliosyne
You can test this for yourself by creating a user account, then editing the master password database and manually changing the username without recalculating the password hash. The password will still work. If the username was part of the hash input, the password would fail.
The main attack vector these days is GPU-based compute. There, SHA* algorithms are particularly weak because they can be so efficiently computed. Unlike SHA algorithms, bcrypt generates high memory contention, even on modern GPUs.
Add in the constraint of broad support, low "honest use" cost, and maturity (extensive hostile cryptanalysis), bcrypt stays as one of the better choices even 25 year later.
That said, bcrypt's main limitation is it has a low memory-size cost. There are some newer algorithms that improve on bcrypt by increasing the memory-size cost to more than is practical even for FPGA attacks.
More importantly, bcrypt didn't actually fail here. The vulnerability happened because okta didn't use it correctly. All crypto is insecure if you use it wrong enough.
If the salt is externally known, which the username and userID necessarily are, then the rainbow table for that account can be computed entirely offline, defeating the point of salting.
Router is OPNsense with its own validating recursor, domain blacklist, and routing blackhole.
Phone runs a private VPN to my router when not on my home network.