Science becomes a half-empirical speculative activity in all other cases. So yes, a lot of genetics (but not all), and so on, is a speculative science. Eg., very rarely some finite number of known genes can be given a known causal mechanism (etc.) -- in this cases, you have a Science.
When geneticists are studying eg., single-gene-to-single-disease relationships then this is science. When they're studying possible trajectories of 1000s of genes on down-stream phenomneon with an amazing number of uncontrollable causes.. then i'd be inclined to call this pseduoscience.
The line isn't arbitrary at all, but based on hard facts about the nature of reality and our ability to measure it.
Modelling the weather is a science if it is done based on extremely recent history, and the models are explanatory and accurate to within a relevant time horizon. If you use the same models to predict the weather next year, that's pseduoscience.
Pseudoscience is often deeply apparently scientific -- resuing all the same statsitical formulae, etc. -- this is a charade. It is reality which decides that these techniques are broken, not the techniques themselves.
Sure, and you’re welcome to have personal preferences. My point is just that “hard science” sounds like an objective term but it’s neither well-defined nor objective. Calling it “specialties which mjburgess likes” would be just meaningful.
So we're in a very very bad situation in these cases. It isnt that mere speculation is invovled as an input, its that mere speculation is the output.
I guess, there is rather little hard science done in the world then/a lot of science is speculative in your view (maybe only most of mathematics would survive if it were a science).
Mathematics isnt a science at all, since its a study of number not of cause: there is no inferential gap between measures and their causes in mathematics, because there are no measures.
> operationalizable theory of causal mechanisms
A theory whose terms refer, at some point, to measurable variables that can in some contexts be controlled. So, eg., you might have a theory of light which tells you necessarily how to adjust for some lighting effect in some experiment, even if you cannot control it in that experiment.
The key relation that Science has is Necessity, since it is a study of cause. If your "science" has no means of obtaining necessary relata between physical objects, then it's not a science.
This is perfectly fine. And it does make science in some minimal literal sense "speculative".
My issue is with an extreme depature from this method. Where you open a psychology textbook and there are no causal theories, no quantification of the number and nature of causes, and hence no way of designing experiments with controls, and so on.
This kinds of activity may, at some great distance, resemble each other -- but one is capable of reliably producing knowldge (even if in small quantity), and the other is not. That latter mechanism produces, imv, at least as much wholesale nonesense.
That's not true. For example in researching prime numbers, mathematicians carry out simulations and produce observational results from those simulations, without having a fully-proven formal theory to support the results.