There are no problems that can't be modeled without category theory. One of the most foundational category theorems is the Yoneda Lemma, which directly states that any problem phrased in the language of categories can be translated to the language of sets and functions. The same is true of every mathematical object with a definition in terms of sets - you could always replace the name with its definition.

The contribution of category theoretic language to the implicit framework of a theory can't be larger than the definition of a category, which is very small. You could be asking "why use groups when sets with an associative operation exhibiting closure, an identity and an inverse are more approachable?" Abstract algebra is based on a library of definitions that refer to types of operations on sets that are simple enough to be common. A tool or a technique are not the kind of things you can find in a definition.

Rings, vector spaces and modules get a sort of instant acceptance for what they are, but categories have believers and disbelievers. I am curious about how that can happen.