Cool, we got the “if you don’t have anything to hide” argument out of the way early.

Now we can discuss the actual privacy implications of this news

Are you discussing the privacy implications? It looks like your only comment is this asinine middlebrow dismissal. Meanwhile, I've given actionable advice.

I don't think you get to charge anyone else with assinine.

If a tool does not perform as designed, all users of the tool have an interest in knowing that, and working towards correcting that.

It doesn't matter that there are both good and bad users.

The tool performed as designed. This took a months-long international investigation using social engineering and monitoring of hundreds of nodes to to identify four users that were being specifically targeted. It wasn't some novel attack, it's literally something that has always been possible with enough resources.

Ergo, users: don't warrant the resources. Your threat model should not be the same as CSAM site operators.

Also, you misspelled asinine.

Most attacks on Tor are through social engineering. Think DPR. Error occurs between keyboard and chair.

Tor can't protect you from terrible opsec.

This is what everyone here seems to forget when they're ranting on about surveillance: that there are serious criminals out there who need to be caught. In this case, child abusers.

Whoever the engineers are who've worked on the technical aspects of deanonymizing Tor connections, they should feel very proud of their work and the good it's doing in the world.