Why would there be. If the key is 'revokable' that is a weakness in it self.
Ish. The threat of that is part of a different risk model, and probably less serious.
A long-lived certificate that ends up being able to be used by a malicious party (perhaps due to a leak of the private key) could be serious for many users if the certificate can't be reliably revoked, which they currently can't be.
A mistaken or malicious revocation if someone were to manage that could be an issue to the service operator (users can't get in) but this is a safer failure than users connecting to a malicious shadow service due, for example, to an accidentally exposed private key and a DNS poisoning attack.
As others have mentioned: if revocation worked better currently, this would be less of an issue.
???
Why?
At least perceived censorship risk is why the archive.is guy always uses HTTP links and not HTTPS links for his site, iirc.
I don't really get the argument behind using HTTP links to avoid the censorship risk with HTTPS - just provide both and get the best of both worlds. Also, using HTTP is far more prone to being interfered with in transit - I recall BT (or their ISP business department) trialling that and injecting adverts into HTTP pages. I can't recall any instance of HTTPS being censored by restricting certificates.
The majority of CAs are in the US.
I guess it decreases the lead time of censorship. That seems pretty minor though.
What??
This does not make sense. Keys are revocable in most crypto systems.
A few older crypto mechanisms were designed around trusting one thing totally. For example, everything's secure until the end of time provided that the user keeps a private key totally private at all times, with no interruption, ever, and if the user lapses then the overall mechanism breaks really badly.
They were complicated mechanisms held together by a screw made of a metal which was assumed to be infinitely strong.
The current fashion is to trust thing in a more limited way, and to design systems such that they won't blow up spectactularly if something breaks. Being able to revoke keys is part of that, it is a weakness that helps to avoid a really bad weakness.
For example, some sites were closed and we asked the site owner to revoke their cert. We got "What does that mean ?", they had lost their private key.
Also other departments had certs that expired, they had no idea what to do. I left over a year ago, and someone who knows more about certs that I do left not long afterwards. I know many certs are due expire soon, good luck to them.
The point of this is I can see 45 day certs being a huge issue for that company. When I left they were looking into non-expiring certs. I have no idea what they ended up doing.
FWIW, this is a fortune 500 company.
But to set it all up in F500 size company, that is totally different discussion and not only TLS certs but all kind of other cert auth that happens there.
Servers get compromised sometimes, people do stupid things with keys, etc.
We dont have a really good way of revoking keys after something bad happens. We have some bad ways, but they kind of suck.
An additional reason might be making it easier to punish a misbehabing CA (CAs are often too big to fail, you cant ban them without breaking half the internet)