There is basically no security focused pc hardware, aside from maybe raptor systems which isn’t really the same ilk.
Off the top of my head, a lot of these devices and hardware were scam traps by LEO.
I’d go on a limb and say this isn’t a problem anyone actually wants to solve.
Physical security is another big factor, there is a long checklist for a SCIF that at some level takes into account TEMPEST type threats that mitigate many attacks on air gapped systems.
And none of these things are the default on commercial software because users want it to be frictionless. They want software to install right away when you plug in a usb drive, etc.
Fast forward a few years, and the computer was still running great. The desktop and downloads folders were full of messengers, "flash players" and other malware - but all binaries were throwing cryptic error. Since no one in IT was around or cared, nobody figured out how to edit the allow list. The computer was deemed half-broken. But when neighboring PCs were completely infested, this one could still open, edit, and print office docs flawlessly.
It felt like a magic fix for shared Windows PC security.
ACRORD32.EXE was actually cmd.exe
WINWORD.EXE was actually Mozilla
...and so on
Edit: one of those exes was regedit and every time I sat down I'd delete all the keys named Policies as a routine excersize. After that, restart explorer with one of the tricks. I don't remember the specific one but it wasn't officially documented iirc.
https://superuser.com/questions/335917/how-can-you-do-a-clea...
I think that will greatly reduce the ability to get work done. It's my understanding that the workflow for using these specific airgapped computers involved moving USB thumb drives between computers.
Now you're making me wonder if keyboard firmware could be an attack vehicle.
All the technical "hacking" happened on the non-air-gapped side, so that that computer would put malware onto the USB with a deceptive presentation (an .exe with an icon to look like a folder and with the same name as an expected folder, while the actual folder was hidden). The rest is social engineering (and Windows not showing the .exe extension).
[1]: `pip3.exe` is an example; it's hard-coded to run the Pip module from `site-packages`, but `pip.py` could be replaced. More to the point, these wrappers are automatically created by Setuptools, to run an arbitrary script specified in the build process, from a "stub" included with Setuptools. (All of this is to work around the lack of support for shebangs, of course.) I don't know if Setuptools can or does sign these wrappers. Probably not.
* force prompting executing anything off external media
* disallow anything other than input devices for USB
* disallow unsigned binaries from running
* work to require usb peripherals to carry a unique cryptographic signature so that you can easily lock the set of allowed devices once the machine is set up
Heck, a lot of this stuff could be valuable to help secure corporate IT machines too.