As far as I understand, in WASM memory is linear, so if I compile C++ to WASM, isn't it possible to reference a random segment of memory (say, via an unchecked array index exploit) and then do whatever you want with it (exploit other bugs in the original C++ app). The only benefit is that access to the OS isolated, but all the other exploits are still possible (and impossible in JVM/.NET).
Am I missing something?
Also see: https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity20/presentat...
„We find that many classic vulnerabilities which, due to common mitigations, are no longer exploitable in native binaries, are completely exposed in WebAssembly. Moreover, WebAssembly enables unique attacks, such as overwriting supposedly constant data or manipulating the heap using a stack overflow.”
My understanding is that people talking about wasm being more secure mostly talk about the ability to escape the sandbox or access unintended APIs, not integrity of the app itself.
We're mostly concerned with being able to visit a malicious site, and execute wasm from that site without that wasm being able to execute arbitrary code on the host - breaking out of the sandbox in order to execute malware. You say the only benefit is that access to the OS is isolated, but that's the big benefit.
Having said that, WebAssembly has some design decisions that make your exploits significantly more difficult in practice. The call stack is a separate stack from WebAssembly memory that's effectively invisible to the running WebAssembly program, so return oriented programming exploits should be impossible. Also WebAssembly executable bytecode is separate from WebAssembly memory, making it impossible to inject bytecode via a buffer overflow + execute it.
If you want to generate WebAssembly code at runtime, link it in as a new function, and execute it, you need participation from the host, e.g. https://wingolog.org/archives/2022/08/18/just-in-time-code-g...
WASM, in broswers, runs entirely inside a secure environment with no access to the system.
js->browser->os
|
+--Flash/java-->os
vs wasm->browser->os
further. WASM and Js are in their own process with no os acesss. they can't access the os except by rpc to the broswerflash/java tho, ran all user code in the same process with full access to the os
chrome started with that but also started without GPU based graphics and spent 2-3 years adding yet another process make it possible. mozilla and safari took almost 10 years to catch up.
Both Java and .NET verify their bytecode.
>Wasm bytecode is trivial (as it gets) to turn into machine code
JVM and .NET bytecodes aren't supercomplicated either.
Probably the only real differences are: 1) WASM was designed to be more modular and slimmer from the start, while Java and .NET were designed to be fat; currently there are modularization efforts, but it's too late 2) WASM is an open standard from the start and so browser vendors implement it without plugins
Other than that, it feels like WASM is a reinvention of what already existed before.
The difference is in the surface area of the standard library -- Java applets exposed a lot of stuff that turned out to have a lot of security holes, and it was basically impossible to guarantee there weren't further holes. In WASM, the linear memory and very simple OS interface makes the sandboxing much more tractable.
What I’m thinking of is simply memory corruption issues from the linear memory model, and while these can only corrupt the given process, not anything outside, it is still not something the JVM allows.
Wasm GC also introduces non-null reference types, and the validation algorithm guarantees that locals of declared non-null type cannot be used before being initialized. That's also done as part of the single-pass verification.
Wasm GC has a lower-level object model and type system than the JVM (basically structs, arrays, and first-class functions, to which object models are lowered), so it's possible that a higher-level type system, when lowered to Wasm GC, may not be enforceable at the bytecode level. So you could, e.g. screw up the virtual dispatch sequence of a Java method call and end up with a Wasm runtime type error.
> Two’s complement signed integers in 32 bits and optionally 64 bits.
https://webassembly.org/docs/portability/#assumptions-for-ef...
And nothing suggesting unsigned ints here:
https://webassembly.github.io/spec/core/appendix/index-instr...
See how there's only i32.load and i32.eq, but there's i32.lt_u and i32.lt_s. Loading bits from memory or comparing them is the same operation bit for bit for each of signed and unsigned. However, less than requires knowing the desired signess, and is split between signed and unsigned.
With the two's complement convention, the concept of 'signedness' only matters when a narrow integer value needs to be extended to a wider value (e.g. 8-bit to 16-bit), specifically whether the new bits needs to be replicated from the narrow value's topmost bit (for signed extension) or set to zero (for unsigned extension).
It would be interesting to speculate what a high level language would look like with such sign-agnostic "Schroedinger's integer types").
- Wasm has verification specification that wasm bytecode must comply to. This verified subset makes security exploits seen in those older technologies outright impossible. Attacks based around misbehaving hardware like heartbleed or rowhammer might still be possible, but you, eg, can't reference memory outside of your wasm's memory by tricking the VM to interpret a number you have as a pointer to memory that doesn't belong to you.
- Wasm bytecode is trivial (as it gets) to turn into machine code. So implementations can be smaller and faster than using a VM.
- Wasm isn't owned by a specific company, and has an open and well written specification anyone can use.
- It has been adopted as a web standard, so no browser extensions are required.
As for computation on clients versus serves, that's already true for Javascript. More true in fact, since wasm code can be efficient in ways that are impossible for Javascript.