If most Tor users ran exit nodes and most people used Tor, it would effectively make internet traffic anonymous. But without those network effects, it is vulnerable by design to deanonymization attacks by state actors.
This also means the expiry time is usually tied to however long a Tor exit node stays on the DNSBL + 3 or so days (depends on how long the software is configured, but 3 days is typically the assumed default for IPs that tend to get mixed up with automated spam, of which Tor is also a massive purveyor.)
I had the impression, with onion services they are a thing of the past.
Seemed like onion services were created to solve the security issues that exit nodes bring, so I assumed people stopped using them and started running onion services instead.
I'd call tor broken against any adversary with a little technical skill and willingness to spend $5000.
I'm 80% sure Tor is designed as a US supported project to focus those needing anonymity into a service only governments with global security apparatus (who can grab a good chunk of internet traffic) can access.