The reality seems to be that only RapidSSL and FreeSSL are practically vulnerable; of the small subset of CAs that will sign with MD5, they're the two that will sign predictably; the others randomize the serial number field.
Moreover, this is an exceedingly hard vulnerability to exploit. Sotirov's team not only had a cluster of PS3s running custom code optimized to quickly find MD5 collisions, but were also working with a new academic result on collision-finding that has not yet been published.
Anyhow, the program you want to check this out is Firefox itself: Preferences -> Advanced -> Encryption -> View Certificates -> Authorities -> "View" -> Details.
I removed the list from that link, anyhow. I didn't understand the 'sign predictably' part you pointed out, much appreciated.
http://www.gridvm.org/rogue-root-cas-because-of-md5-collisio...