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Re:Orphaning bcachefs-tools in Debian by cogman10 on Saturday August 31, 2024 @09:06AM (#41408605)
Fair point.

I do think we need to reevaluate how security is managed in terms of software. It's often the case that we say "this library version has a CVE, we need to update it!" However, it's not often the case that the CVE in the library is even exploitable from the parent application.

I'm thinking of a recent 9 CVE against zlib... But actually it was a rarely used extension API for working with compressed files.

Something like path tracing to see if a vulnerable API is even accessible from the parent application/library before instructing the universe to adopt a new version.

Re:Orphaning bcachefs-tools in Debian by miki123211 on Saturday August 31, 2024 @10:42AM (#41409226)
Rust has the advantage of aggressively gating many library APIs behind feature flags as a convention. A lot of third-party libraries consist of a core of the most essential functionality that the entire library just can't go without, and everything else, particularly things that require yet more external dependencies to work, is gated behind a feature.

You could imagine a model where security vulnerability reports include a combination of features required to trigger that vulnerability. If the vulnerability was in a rarely-used extension, like it was for Zlib, many dependents would be automatically marked as non-vulnerable because they wouldn't have the necessary feature flag active.

Re:Orphaning bcachefs-tools in Debian by tsimionescu on Saturday August 31, 2024 @02:59PM (#41411012)
I think it's already complicated to find all the software that uses a library version that has a known vulnerability, because of the many slightly different versions floating around, static linking, software running in docker containers etc. Expecting to further identify which applications use a particular part of a library gets even more difficult, and lazy developers will use this as an excuse not to patch far more often than you'll save on unnecessary updates.

Not to mention, this already happens to some extent, especially for older versions of software: distributors and developers do sometimes say "we will not provide a patch because even if we use the affected library, we don't use it in a way that triggers the vulnerability".