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Re:Cryptographic Right Answers: Post Quantum Edition by kientuong114 on Thursday August 15, 2024 @07:37AM (#41254857)
The right answer is not always about straight-out security: 2048-bit RSA is not broken and won't be broken for the foreseeable future, but we know that it is much less efficient and more error-prone than e.g. ECDH. So why suggest the former when the latter is a better alternative?

You should consider these "right answers" as if the question were, "I want to develop a new product today. What cryptographic primitive should I use?"

Re:Cryptographic Right Answers: Post Quantum Edition by SAI_Peregrinus on Thursday August 15, 2024 @03:44PM (#41259644)
Even that is more subtle. RSASSA-2048-PKCS#1v1.5 is fine if leaking that you signed the same plaintext more than once isn't a threat. If that is a threat then you need RSASSA-2048-PKCS#1v2, (AKA RSA-PSS-2048).

RSAES-2048-PKCS#1v1.5 has implementation-dependent security; implementations keep getting broken due to padding oracle attacks. RSA-KEM-2048 is fine, though slower than ECDH.