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A comment on From object transition to RCE in the Chrome renderer. Parent comment

Re:From object transition to RCE in the Chrome renderer by js2 on Tuesday August 13, 2024 @04:32PM (#41239505)
> I then leverage this to achieve arbitrary memory read and write outside of the v8 heap sandbox, and in turn arbitrary code execution in the Chrome renderer process.

So the code is running in a process that runs as the same user running the browser. That's no longer much of a sandbox and you're now relying on the OS to protect your data, right?

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Re:From object transition to RCE in the Chrome renderer by soiax on Tuesday August 13, 2024 @04:47PM (#41239676)
No. There is a reason the author keeps repeating "arbitrary code execution in the Chrome renderer process." Because it's there, not in the browser process.
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Re:From object transition to RCE in the Chrome renderer by armchairhacker on Tuesday August 13, 2024 @05:39PM (#41240134)
https://github.com/github/securitylab/tree/main/SecurityExpl...

> If successful, on Ubuntu 22.04, it should call launch xcalc when calc.html is opened in Chrome.

Then how does this work? It doesn't look like the provided build flags disable any sandbox that the distributed build doesn't.

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Re:From object transition to RCE in the Chrome renderer by soiax on Wednesday August 14, 2024 @06:27AM (#41244544)
You can disable it runtime, with --no-sandbox command line option.
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Re:From object transition to RCE in the Chrome renderer by bri3d on Tuesday August 13, 2024 @04:40PM (#41239593)
No. You're relying on the OS's sandboxing features, which are much, much more granular than just "the same user running the browser."

https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/HEAD/docs/d...

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