News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:CrowdStrike accepting the PwnieAwards for "most epic fail... by JumpCrisscross on Sunday August 11, 2024 @01:05PM (#41217625)
> E.g. ambulances not turning up in time etc. due to paper and pen fallbacks

Sure. Did this happen?

Why were the “emergency management downtime procedures” insufficient [1]?

[1] https://www.healthcaredive.com/news/crowdstrike-outage-hits-...

Re:CrowdStrike accepting the PwnieAwards for "most epic fail... by tgsovlerkhgsel on Sunday August 11, 2024 @01:18PM (#41217721)
If they were equally good as the non-emergency procedures, why wouldn't we use them all the time?
Re:CrowdStrike accepting the PwnieAwards for "most epic fail... by JumpCrisscross on Sunday August 11, 2024 @01:19PM (#41217730)
> why wouldn't we use them all the time?

Because they’re more expensive. They’re all not “equally good,” they’re good enough to keep people alive. (You repurpose resources from elective and billing procedures, et cetera.)

Re:CrowdStrike accepting the PwnieAwards for "most epic fail... by FireBeyond on Sunday August 11, 2024 @01:27PM (#41217783)
This belies a lack of understanding.

What resources are you repurposing from elective procedures exactly? Your patient load hasn’t changed, and day surgical instruments and supplies are from the same pool. There’s no “well this pile of equipment is only for elective procedures”.

I’m not even sure what “billing procedures you’d repurpose (especially in your context of “keeping people alive”).

Re:CrowdStrike accepting the PwnieAwards for "most epic fail... by JumpCrisscross on Sunday August 11, 2024 @01:30PM (#41217806)
> Your patient load hasn’t changed, and day surgical instruments and supplies are from the same pool

The outage didn’t change any of these things either.

> not even sure what “billing procedures you’d repurpose

At Mount Sinai, billing staff were redirected to watch newborn babies. Apparently the electronic doors stopped working during the outage.

Re:CrowdStrike accepting the PwnieAwards for "most epic fail... by FireBeyond on Sunday August 11, 2024 @07:06PM (#41219896)
> The outage didn’t change any of these things either.

Never said that it did. I just don't think your idea of emergency downtime procedures at a hospital are what they are. There's paper and offline charting, most meds can be retrieved similarly, and so on. I heard a claim (from someone here) that an ER was unable to do CPR due to the outage, which could not be remotely true. Crash carts are available and are specifically set up to not require anything else but a combination. Drugs, IV/IO access, etc.

> At Mount Sinai, billing staff were redirected to watch newborn babies.

That sounds like something I would have imagined security doing. To be clear, what they most likely meant here is in the sense of "avoiding abduction of a newborn", not any kind of access to observe and oversee neonates.

Re:CrowdStrike accepting the PwnieAwards for "most epic fail... by tgsovlerkhgsel on Sunday August 11, 2024 @09:58PM (#41220599)
I would expect them to be good enough to prevent "obvious" deaths-from-failed-procedures, but deliver a slightly lower quality of care, so that if out of 100 very seriously ill people 50 survived during normal operation, this would turn into e.g. 49.

All of this without the person obviously dying due to the alternative procedures - just e.g. the doctor saw the patient less often and didn't notice some condition as early as they would have under normal procedures.

Would you consider this assumption to be wrong? (I am a layperson, not familiar with how hospitals work except from being a patient.)

Re:CrowdStrike accepting the PwnieAwards for "most epic fail... by bt1a on Sunday August 11, 2024 @01:13PM (#41217683)
Probably because our incredibly inefficient, burdened, and splintered healthcare system barely functions as is, and they do not have the time nor resources to pause and put in place an emergency downtime operating protocol that works as well as their 15 year old windows cobweb
Re:CrowdStrike accepting the PwnieAwards for "most epic fail... by JumpCrisscross on Sunday August 11, 2024 @01:15PM (#41217697)
> because our incredibly inefficient, burdened, and splintered healthcare system barely functions as is, and they do not have the time nor resources to pause and put in place an emergency downtime operating protocol

You just responded to an article about the implementation of emergency downtime protocols by speculating, baselessly, that such protocols cannot possibly exist because your mental model of our healthcare system prohibits it. Ironically, all within the context of why software development doesn’t hold itself to the rigors of engineering.

Re:CrowdStrike accepting the PwnieAwards for "most epic fail... by rightbyte on Sunday August 11, 2024 @01:52PM (#41218004)
"In Alaska, both non-emergency and 911 calls went unanswered at multiple dispatch centers for seven hours.

Some personnel were shifted to the centers that were still up and running to help with their increased load of calls, while others switched to analog phone systems, Austin McDaniel, state public safety department spokesperson, told USA TODAY in an email. McDaniel said they had a plan in place, but the situation was "certainly unique.”

Agencies in at least seven states reported temporary outages, including the St. Louis County Sheriff's Office, the Faribault Police Department in Minnesota, and 911 systems in New Hampshire, Fulton County, Indiana, and Middletown, Ohio. Reports of 911 outages across the country peaked at more than 100 on Friday just before 3 a.m., according to Downdetector.

In Noble County, Indiana, about 30 miles northwest of Fort Wayne, 911 dispatchers were forced to jot down notes by hand when the system went down in the early morning hours, according to Gabe Creech, the county's emergency management director."

https://eu.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2024/07/19/crowdst...

I mean, even if the dispatch could handle it in some sense, certainly it was a problem, that might have increased average time to site for the ambulance or fire fighters. I've haven't seen any report of any direct death.

Re:CrowdStrike accepting the PwnieAwards for "most epic fail... by JumpCrisscross on Sunday August 11, 2024 @01:59PM (#41218071)
> I've haven't seen any report of any direct death

Exactly. Contrast that with a bridge collapse. It isn’t a mystery or statistical exercise to deduce who died and why.

Re:CrowdStrike accepting the PwnieAwards for "most epic fail... by varjag on Sunday August 11, 2024 @02:38PM (#41218382)
There were numerous bridge collapses without casualties. Naturally if one company could suddenly collapse 80% of Earth's bridges, direct deaths would be assured. It's great there isn't one for some reason!
Re:CrowdStrike accepting the PwnieAwards for "most epic fail... by JumpCrisscross on Sunday August 11, 2024 @02:53PM (#41218490)
> were numerous bridge collapses without casualties

In how many of those cases were criminal charges brought? (It’s not zero. But it’s more limited.)

Re:CrowdStrike accepting the PwnieAwards for "most epic fail... by Log_out_ on Sunday August 11, 2024 @01:23PM (#41217762)
Because energencx downtime is not supossed to be local and global. Dont worry your startup will not eat those riscs, but neither will those customers stay once insurrance rewrites the guidlines. All that can happen,has already happened, its just consequences propagating now. Nothing we can do with simple blameshifting tactics.
Re:CrowdStrike accepting the PwnieAwards for "most epic fail... by jimmySixDOF on Sunday August 11, 2024 @08:45PM (#41220291)
I have argued for years every business should have an analogue operations guide tested every once in a while like a fire drill down to pre-printed carbon copypaper forms. A Lights Out Phones Off Business Continuity Plan would have helped American Airlines too.