Are you telling me the cybersecurity scene is special and shouldn’t follow best practices for software deployment?
If customers found out that some are getting roll out faster than the others, essentially splitting the group into 2, there will be a need for customer opt-in/opt-out.
If everyone is opting-out because of Friday, your Canary deployment becomes meaningless.
Any proof that other Cybersecurity vendors do Canary deployment for their AV definition? :)
PS: not to say that the company should test more internally...
If this is just how they roll with regular definition updates, then their deployment practices are garbage and this kind of large scale disaster was inevitable.
You can guess, but you cannot be 100% sure.
>I’m out of the loop if this crowdstrike update was such a scenario where best practices for software deployment were worth bypassing.
I did post a question: what about other Cybersecurity vendors? Do you think they do canary deployment on their AV definitions?
Here's more context to understand Cybersecurity: https://radixweb.com/blog/what-is-mean-time-to-detect
Cybersecurity companies participate in Sec evaluation annually that evaluates (measure) and grade their performance. That grade is an input for Organizations to select vendors outside their own metrics/measurements.
I worked in the cyber security space for a decent chunk of my career, and the most frustrating part was cyber security engineers thinking their problems were unique and being completely unaware of the lessons software engineering teams have already learned.
Yes, you need to tune your canary deployment groups to be large and diverse enough to give a reliable indicator of deployment failure, while still keeping them small enough that they achieve their purpose of limiting blast radius.
Again, if you follow industry best practices for software deployment, this is already something that should be considered. This is a relatively solved problem -- this is not new.
> I did post a question: what about other Cybersecurity vendors? Do you think they do canary deployment on their AV definitions?
I think that question is being asked right now by every company using Crowdstrike — what vendors are actually doing proper release engineering and how fast can we switch to them so that this never happens to us again?
You have to ask the customer if they're okay with that citing "our software might failed and brick your machine".
I'd like to see any Sales and Marketing folks say that ;)
> I think that question is being asked right now by every company using Crowdstrike — what vendors are actually doing proper release engineering and how fast can we switch to them so that this never happens to us again?
Uber valid question and this BSOD incident might be a turning point for customers to pay up more for their IT infrastructure.
It's like: previously Cybersecurity vendors are shy to ask customers to setup Canary systems because that's just "one-more-thing-to-do". After BSOD: customers will smarten up and do it without being asked and to the point where they would ask Vendors to _support_ that type of deployment (unless they continue to be cheap and lazy).
I think you’re still missing the point of Canary deployments. The question your sales team should ask is “would you like a 5% chance of a bug harming your system, or a 100% chance?”
> It's like: previously Cybersecurity vendors are shy to ask customers to setup Canary systems because that's just "one-more-thing-to-do"
You should by shy because it is not your customer’s job to set up canary deployments. Crowdstrike owns the software and the deployment process. They should be deploying to a subset of machines, measuring the results, and deciding whether to roll forward or roll back. It is not the customers job to implement good release engineering controls for Crowdstrike (although after this debacle you may well see customers try).
What I find it hard is those in Software that suggested to roll it to a few customers first because this isn't cloud deployment doing A/B test when it comes to Virus Definition.
Customers must know what's going on when it comes to virus definition and the implication of them whether they're being part of the rollout group or not.
No, I’m talking about external deployment to customers. They clearly also had a massive failure in their internal processes too, since a bug this egregious should never make it to the release stage. But that is not what I am talking about right now.
> What I find it hard is those in Software that suggested to roll it to a few customers first because this isn't cloud deployment doing A/B test when it comes to Virus Definition.
I don’t care what you’re releasing to customers— application binary, configuration change, virus definition, etc, if it has the chance of doing this much damage it must be deployed in a controlled, phased way. You cannot 100% one-shot deploy any change that has the potential to boot-loop a massive amount of systems like this. This current process is unacceptable.
> Customers must know what's going on when it comes to virus definition and the implication of them whether they're being part of the rollout group or not.
Who says they don’t have to know? Telling your customers that an update is planned and giving them a time window for their update seems reasonable to me.
* 0day is happening
* Cybersecurity vendors preparing virus definition
* Vendors send update => new virus definition is about to go down in 1 hour, get ready.
Folks are asleep, nobody reads it?
Let's say now let's do Canary: let's deploy to a few customers (this is unclear how this started: should this be opt-in? opt-out?)
Some customers got it, others... who knows, unclear what the processes are here.
Between here and there, 0day exploited customers because AV defn is not there. What now?
I'm not sure how this plays out tbh.