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Re:Polyfill supply chain attack hits 100K+ sites by commandlinefan on Wednesday June 26, 2024 @11:13AM (#40800966)
One of these days we're going to learn our lesson and just write our own damned code.
Re:Polyfill supply chain attack hits 100K+ sites by felideon on Wednesday June 26, 2024 @11:28AM (#40801153)
We won't, as can be seen by everyone recommending having an LLM write your code.
Re:Polyfill supply chain attack hits 100K+ sites by sandwitches on Wednesday June 26, 2024 @11:31AM (#40801191)
Some of us already have learned that lesson. Imagine how it feels to have to watch the same people touch the same hot stove over and over again. And people wonder why programmers quit and go into farming...
Re:Polyfill supply chain attack hits 100K+ sites by kelsey98765431 on Wednesday June 26, 2024 @11:21AM (#40801059)
One has to admit the game of cat and mouse that the web browser brought about has been quite valuable for advancing security as a field, unfortunately this sort of thing seems like we have to get burned to learn the pan is hot and mother warning us is not enough.

Pay your security teams more, people.

Re:Polyfill supply chain attack hits 100K+ sites by mulmen on Wednesday June 26, 2024 @11:49AM (#40801367)
Security is everyone’s job. You can’t outsource responsibility. The security tram should be compensated fairly but they should also be trusted within the organization. If you want to build secure software then realign incentives. There’s more to that than pay.
Re:Polyfill supply chain attack hits 100K+ sites by emporas on Wednesday June 26, 2024 @12:22PM (#40801674)
> Security is everyone’s job.

Agree. There is something missing from the internet, and that is "Programmer Citizenship". As soon as someone pushes code to a repo, he has to prove his citizenship first, the good old fashioned way by handing his identity to the owner of the repo. His digital identity of course.

As long as the identity is real, and is associated with a clean reputation, then code can be accepted with very little risk. When the reputation might not be so great, then new code has to be double checked before any merge into main.

Re:Polyfill supply chain attack hits 100K+ sites by emporas on Wednesday June 26, 2024 @12:24PM (#40801684)
> One has to admit the game of cat and mouse that the web browser brought about

Supply chain attacks can affect any toolchain, command line tools, games, everything under the sun.

Re:Polyfill supply chain attack hits 100K+ sites by creshal on Wednesday June 26, 2024 @11:25AM (#40801118)
Or just ship local copies of your dependencies. It's not that hard.
Re:Polyfill supply chain attack hits 100K+ sites by commandlinefan on Wednesday June 26, 2024 @03:52PM (#40803927)
... and all of _their_ dependencies. And read through them all to make sure that the local copy that you shipped didn't actually include a deliberately obfuscated exfiltration routine.
Re:Polyfill supply chain attack hits 100K+ sites by AndyMcConachie on Wednesday June 26, 2024 @11:24AM (#40801108)
How hard is it to download your includes and host them on your own domain?

I know sometimes it's not possible, but whenever I can I always do this. If only because it means that if the remote version changes to a new version it doesn't break my code.

Re:Polyfill supply chain attack hits 100K+ sites by echoangle on Wednesday June 26, 2024 @11:22AM (#40801073)
Or just use subresource integrity
Re:Polyfill supply chain attack hits 100K+ sites by stevenpetryk on Wednesday June 26, 2024 @11:31AM (#40801183)
Subresource integrity wouldn't work with Polyfill.io scripts, since they dynamically changed based on user agent.
Re:Polyfill supply chain attack hits 100K+ sites by CPLX on Wednesday June 26, 2024 @11:20AM (#40801043)
Bet we won’t.
Re:Polyfill supply chain attack hits 100K+ sites by dvngnt_ on Wednesday June 26, 2024 @11:29AM (#40801162)
yeah let me just write an entire operating system to create a to-do list app
Re:Polyfill supply chain attack hits 100K+ sites by sandwitches on Wednesday June 26, 2024 @11:34AM (#40801221)
Fortunately, people have already designed an operating system for you. You can either use it, or embed six more half-assed versions into a web browser and then ship that instead. Up to you.
Re:Polyfill supply chain attack hits 100K+ sites by hyperhopper on Wednesday June 26, 2024 @11:20AM (#40801057)
Then you get to write 10x the vulnerabilities yourself and not have nearly the same chance of any of them getting disclosed to you!
Re:Polyfill supply chain attack hits 100K+ sites by ChrisMarshallNY on Wednesday June 26, 2024 @11:24AM (#40801107)
That argument doesn't seem to be aging well.

I'd say that good [emphasis on "good"] coders can write very secure code. There's fundamental stuff, like encryption algos, that should be sourced from common (well-known and trusted) sources, but when we load in 100K of JS, so we can animate a disclosure triangle, I think it might not be a bad time to consider learning to do that, ourselves.

Re:Polyfill supply chain attack hits 100K+ sites by vikramkr on Wednesday June 26, 2024 @04:14PM (#40804140)
It's impossible to tell how that argument is aging since we don't have the counterfactual.
Re:Polyfill supply chain attack hits 100K+ sites by sandwitches on Wednesday June 26, 2024 @11:32AM (#40801199)
So if you can't trust your developers to manage dependencies, and you can't trust them to write dependencies... why have you hired them at all? Seriously, what do they actually do? Hire people who can program, it isn't hard.