Re:Amazon Web Services signature version 1 is insecure
by brl on Thursday December 18, 2008 @01:22PM
(#402410)
Forward secrecy was one of the important mistakes I had in mind actually. If you use TLS naively, you have none. You probably didn't even realize you needed it.
Verifying certificates correctly is not so easy to get right either, if you can even figure out what PKI means for your particular application in the first place.
Re:Amazon Web Services signature version 1 is insecure
by tptacek on Thursday December 18, 2008 @01:32PM
(#402417)
Certificates are a lot like git branching. They're intimidating if you consider them in their entirety, but simple if you stick to your old use cases.
Enterprise apps make good use of certificates. A common use case is to set up a private CA (a three-line shell script) and issue internal certs to all endpoints in a system; you can then do crypto-strong access control just by checking signatures. This is approximately to PKI what "using git just like you used Subversion" is to git.
Another place where TLS has been a huge win is in wireless security; EAP-TLS with mutual certificate auth is the de facto corporate wireless security standard now.
SSLv1 may have been originally designed for securing credit cards, but I'm not sure that argument survives a close read of TLS; why waste time with mutual authentication, with forward secrecy, with a custom record layer, with arbitrary length certificate signing chains, etc etc etc. You might be surprised at the number of systems that leverage TLS successfully on ports other than 443.
We probably agree; no matter how you choose to implement crypto security in a system, you're probably worse off for trying.