SSLv1 may have been originally designed for securing credit cards, but I'm not sure that argument survives a close read of TLS; why waste time with mutual authentication, with forward secrecy, with a custom record layer, with arbitrary length certificate signing chains, etc etc etc. You might be surprised at the number of systems that leverage TLS successfully on ports other than 443.
We probably agree; no matter how you choose to implement crypto security in a system, you're probably worse off for trying.
Verifying certificates correctly is not so easy to get right either, if you can even figure out what PKI means for your particular application in the first place.
Enterprise apps make good use of certificates. A common use case is to set up a private CA (a three-line shell script) and issue internal certs to all endpoints in a system; you can then do crypto-strong access control just by checking signatures. This is approximately to PKI what "using git just like you used Subversion" is to git.
Another place where TLS has been a huge win is in wireless security; EAP-TLS with mutual certificate auth is the de facto corporate wireless security standard now.
PGP seems to be a popular 'primitive' to try to roll your own broken crypto protocol out of.
Exhibit A: http://enigform.mozdev.org/
Exhibit B: http://web.monkeysphere.info/
Even SSL/TLS is not easy to use correctly (while understanding all the risks) for purposes other than what it was originally designed for: Preventing credit card numbers from being sniffed between a browser and a web merchant.