I would absolutely agree that there's journalists who get significant power and protection from their proximity to major institutions and centres of power. Tor is useful for protecting journalists in situations where they don't have access to that kind of protection. I would agree as you say that's also the case for people that it protects who want to commit really awful forms of harm (who might not have access to this kind of protection). But I'd argue that - in most cases - the majority of really serious and widespread forms of harm are able to exist because of their proximity to different kinds and systems of power. That's not always the case - and these systems of power can compete with one another - but I think it generally holds.

And given that the vast majority of online crime of all kinds isn't anonymous but goes entirely un-enforced against by law enforcement, I would argue that Tor's efforts to distribute power online make relatively little impact on the kinds of crime and harm we see online compared to a lot of other infrastructures built on top of the Internet. I've generally found the more I do this kind of research, the less convinced I am by technical fixes to major social problems - I don't think Tor is a 'fix' to the problem of power, but I think it opens up the battleground a bit for more different (and possibly more hopeful) kinds of future Internet to be built and asserted, that look less like the locked down and centralised versions we're being pitched just now. But I take your points and appreciate you engaging with the arguments in the book.

Actually the relay community is pretty diverse - they have some colourful characters but actually a lot of them are just IT professionals, activists, and people working for libraries or universities. They have come up with some ways (which I talk about in the book) of making them much less likely to get hassle for running an exit - and generally most exit relay operators proceed just fine.