This seems to be an idiosyncratic definition of free will.
This seems like a separate question. Having the power to choose doesn't mean you have every conceivable option in mind, nor that you have the power to exercise every choice, nor even that you like any of the choices.
Did the first particles that ejected from the big bang have free will?
This sounds much too broad - I can't tell what it means. The things I listed are the normal constraints around how we define free will:
> > doesn't mean you have every conceivable option in mind
I think this is what you were exploring in your reply.
> > nor that you have the power to exercise every choice
I might choose to fly, but that doesn't mean that that is what will happen
> > nor even that you like any of the choices
I might be choosing between allowing myself to be robbed and risking being shot, but I am choosing within my horrible options.
> Did the first particles that ejected from the big bang have free will?
I don't think anyone's claiming they did, no.
Whatever happens you'll end up crossing the road right now.
In one example, you absent-mindedly cross the road.
In another example a thought comes to you to get coffee, and you cross the road to get it.
In another example you consider not getting coffee, and going to the park instead, but end up choosing coffee because you feel sluggish.
If there's no free will, any amount of thinking before the decision doesn't prove there's free will. It's just more stuff that was also predetermined. You having an illusion of choice doesn't prove anything.
It's not reasonable to assume one's experience is an illusion without sufficient evidence which is a bar you haven't crossed. Therefore your argument begs the question.
That's why people thought the Sun moved around the Earth. I mean, it's just "common sense" -- you see the Sun in the East in the morning, and then it's in the West in the evening. It turns out "common sense" is not useful for understanding how things work.
I have no reason to doubt my common sense experience.
> we don’t determine how we feel, we are simply served it.
No definition of free will that I have encountered considers it an absolute freedom from any form of determinism. We’re obviously influenced by our nature and external influences. For instance my emotional predispositions are largely determined and my thoughts are not entirely under my control but I do have scope to shape both my emotions and my thoughts over time by what I choose to focus on. I can choose to do what is necessary to change my behavior and to treat people differently than what comes naturally. I know all of this because I have done it, I have experienced it. No materialist philosophy of mind has produced any compelling evidence to contradict my experience of free will in this capacity.