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Re:Justice Department to file antitrust suit against Live Na... by JumpCrisscross on Tuesday April 16, 2024 @06:02PM (#40057778)
> a big driver of cost is the scalpers/hedgers who buy out everything and put it on StubHub

Not true.

About "10% of [performing arts] tickets sold in the primary market are later re-sold by ticket scalpers," increasing to "20-30% of top-tiered seats" [1]. Banning scalping increases attendance but results in "fewer distinct productions...shown in metropolitan areas or states that require ticket resellers to be licensed or that prohibit resale above face value."

Empirically, markets with scalpers have lower ticket prices [2], though this has been studied more in sports than the performing arts. Which makes sense. Scalpers de facto underwrite the seller's risk.

[1] https://www.oxy.edu/sites/default/files/assets/Economics/Chi...

[2] https://www.jstor.org/stable/27698042

Re:Justice Department to file antitrust suit against Live Na... by crabmusket on Tuesday April 16, 2024 @06:13PM (#40057910)
> Empirically, markets with scalpers have lower ticket prices [2]

I haven't read the full paper yet, just the abstract, but the abstract talks about ticket window prices. Do they analyse the prices actually paid by the average attendee, which includes prices paid to scalpers? Or am I misunderstanding the term "ticket window"?

As a lay person, my gut asks: if scalpers don't cause attenders to pay more overall, then why do they exist?

Re:Justice Department to file antitrust suit against Live Na... by JumpCrisscross on Tuesday April 16, 2024 @06:22PM (#40058008)
> Do they analyse the prices actually paid by the average attendee, which includes prices paid to scalpers?

Unclear--the source describes the price variable as the "weighted average of seats normally available to the public" [1]. (It's also from 1992.)

> if scalpers don't cause attenders to pay more overall, then why do they exist?

Same reason underwriters do: they reduce risk for the seller and increase convenience for the buyer. You can absolutely have a situation where a minority of buyers pay more, thereby allowing the remaining 90% to pay less.

[1] https://sci-hub.ru/https://www.jstor.org/stable/2487999

Re:Justice Department to file antitrust suit against Live Na... by hervature on Tuesday April 16, 2024 @06:37PM (#40058152)
The scalper is trading volatility (they may or may not sell the ticket for a higher price) for the opportunity of a return. The venue is getting the opposite side of the deal. Guaranteed income now.
Re:Justice Department to file antitrust suit against Live Na... by crabmusket on Tuesday April 16, 2024 @09:26PM (#40059407)
But if, on average, scalpers didn't get their payout, then they wouldn't take the risk right? Unless scalpers as a class are economically irrational?
Re:Justice Department to file antitrust suit against Live Na... by JumpCrisscross on Tuesday April 16, 2024 @10:09PM (#40059673)
> if, on average, scalpers didn't get their payout, then they wouldn't take the risk

The point is they can get their pay-out while the venue/artist and consumers win. Scalper gets paid. Venue and artist get stability. Consumer who buys from the scalper gets availability. And the other 90% of consumers get cheaper prices.

Re:Justice Department to file antitrust suit against Live Na... by crabmusket on Wednesday April 17, 2024 @12:40AM (#40060483)
I see, I guess that makes sense in theory.
Re:Justice Department to file antitrust suit against Live Na... by matwood on Tuesday April 16, 2024 @09:09PM (#40059310)
Yeah, I used to get great tickets and good prices from scalpers for football and basketball games. Scalpers only work when the demand is so far above the supply. See Taylor Swift. The way to kill scalpers is to do more shows, but she doesn't want to play to a 1/2 full stadium. She'll never do enough shows to completely satisfy demand which will keep prices high.