Re:Xzbot: Notes, honeypot, and exploit demo for the xz backd...
by saagarjha on Wednesday April 03, 2024 @05:56AM
(#39915374)
This kind of thing is quite difficult to do generally, because it is very easy to bypass, has significant performance impact, and has low reliability to boot.
Re:Xzbot: Notes, honeypot, and exploit demo for the xz backd...
by acdha on Wednesday April 03, 2024 @08:26PM
(#39925095)
I’m not saying it’s trivial, but in this case couldn’t you basically do W^X and watch process startup for anomalous behavior? Monkey-patching other libraries’ code should be pretty uncommon.
The main thing I was thinking is that the audit hooking and especially runtime patching across modules (liblzma5 patching functions in the main sshd code block) seems like the kind of thing a generic behavioral profile could get but especially one driven by the fact that sshd does not do any of that normally.
And, yes, performance and reliability issues are a big problem here. When CarbonBlack takes down production again, you probably end up with a bunch of exclusions which mean an actual attacker might be missed.