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Re:Backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to SSH server com... by pmarreck on Saturday March 30, 2024 @10:01AM (#39874979)
I have some questions.

1) Are there no legit code reviews from contributors like this? How did this get accepted into main repos while flying under the radar? When I do a code review, I try to understand the actual code I'm reviewing. Call me crazy I guess!

2) Is there no legal recourse to this? We're talking about someone who managed to root any linux server that stays up-to-date.

Re:Backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to SSH server com... by WhyNotHugo on Saturday March 30, 2024 @10:37AM (#39875288)
> 2) Is there no legal recourse to this? We're talking about someone who managed to root any linux server that stays up-to-date.

Any government which uses GNU/Linux in their infrastructure can pitch this as an attempt to backdoor their servers.

The real question is: will we ever even know who was behind this? If it was some mercenary hacker intending to resell the backdoor, maybe. But if it was someone working with an intelligence agency in US/China/Israel/Russia/etc, I doubt they'll ever be exposed.

Re:Backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to SSH server com... by treffer on Saturday March 30, 2024 @12:52PM (#39876458)
The actual inclusion code was never in the repo. The blobs were hidden as lzma test files.

So you review would need to guess from 2 new test files that those are, decompressed, a backdoor and could be injected which was never in the git history.

This was explicitly build to evade such reviews.

Re:Backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to SSH server com... by xghryro on Saturday March 30, 2024 @02:06PM (#39877132)
I suppose you think the maintainers shouldn’t have scrutinized those files? Please tell me it’s a joke.
Re:Backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to SSH server com... by ab5tract on Saturday March 30, 2024 @07:32PM (#39879699)
The person who added the malicious blobs and signed the compromized archives was literally a maintainer of the project.
Re:Backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to SSH server com... by account42 on Thursday April 04, 2024 @03:48AM (#39927627)
Ok, go ahead and scrutinize those files without looking at the injection code that was never in the repo? Can you find anything malicious? Probably not - it looks like random garbage which is what it was claimed to be.
Re:Backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to SSH server com... by pmarreck on Saturday March 30, 2024 @10:38PM (#39880858)
> The blobs were hidden as lzma test files.

OK, that is absolutely devious.

Re:Backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to SSH server com... by andrepd on Saturday March 30, 2024 @01:53PM (#39877005)
>How did this get accepted into main repos while flying under the radar? When I do a code review, I try to understand the actual code I'm reviewing. Call me crazy I guess!

And? You never do any mistakes? Google "underhanded C contest"

Re:Backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to SSH server com... by xign on Monday April 01, 2024 @08:40AM (#39893513)
"Jia Tan" was not a contributor, but a maintainer of the project. The key point here is that this is a multi-year project of infiltrating the xz project and gaining commit access.

In a large tech company (including ones I have worked at), sometimes you have policy where every change has to be code reviewed by another person. This kind of stuff isn't possible when the whole project only has 1-2 maintainers. Who's going to review your change other than yourself? This is the whole problem of OSS right now that a lot of people are bringing up.

I maintain a widely used open source project myself. I would love it if I could get high quality code review for my commits similar to my last workplace lol, but very very few people are willing to roll up their sleeves like that and work for free. Most people would just go to the Releases page and download your software instead.