Retool points out the "attacker was able to navigate through multiple layers of security" [0], i.e.:
1. "through a SMS-based phishing attack" on "Several employees"
2. "one employee logged into the [SMS phishing] link", "logging into the fake portal"
3. "attacker called the [phished] employee" "and deepfaked our [IT team] employee’s actual voice"
4. "the [phished] employee grew more and more suspicious, but unfortunately did provide the attacker one ... (MFA) code" (over the call)
5. "The additional OTP token shared over the call was critical, because it allowed the attacker to add their own personal device to the employee’s Okta account, which allowed them to produce their own Okta MFA from that point forward."
6. "This enabled them to have an active GSuite session on that device." With "Google Authenticator synchronization feature that syncs MFA codes to the cloud", "if your Google account is compromised, so now are your MFA codes".
By #5, I'm thinking GA sync is about as blameworthy as Okta for allowing a device to be added with just a single additional OTP token shared over a phone call?
Here's a different perspective (tptacek) [1]:
>> We use OTPs extensively at Retool: it’s how we authenticate into [Google, Okta, internal VPN and Retool]
> They should stop using OTPs. OTPs are obsolete. For the past decade, the industry has been migrating from OTPs to phishing-proof authenticators: U2F, then WebAuthn, and now Passkeys†. The entire motivation for these new 2FA schemes is that OTPs are susceptible to phishing, and it is practically impossible to prevent phishing attacks with real user populations
> TOTP is dead. SMS is whatever "past dead" is. Whatever your system of record is for authentication (Okta, Google, what have you), it needs to require phishing-resistant authentication.
> My only concern is the present tense in this post about OTPs, and the diagnosis of the problem this post reached. The problem here isn't software custody of secrets. It's authenticators that only authenticate one way, from the user to the service.
I don't think anyone would seriously claim that, but I think it's fair to call it an unfortunate additional hole in the swiss cheese.
> Google Authenticator started syncing secrets to the cloud[0] which means that those secrets can now be accessed in new ways outside of the user's control[1], which resulted in a huge breach at a startup called Retool[2].
It looks like Google didn't make clear what was happening... There are almost no settings in Authenticator and there is no place to turn "cloud backup" on or off. I found this article that described the feature when it rolled out.
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/google/google-authenti...
If the screenshot is accurate, they blocked access to the tool until "consent" was given to backup codes to Google. The text itself is clear in retrospect but, in my opinion, implies that there will be a choice to backup to Google and that choice was never presented.
"Google Authenticator is Upgrading... You can now sign into your Google Account and backup your Google Authenticator codes to the cloud."
A button is presented labeled "Get Started" and, if you click it, Authenticator will backup all of your codes to the cloud.
I don't remember being presented with this screen but I don't remember a lot of things. I suspect I needed to get a code and simply clicked the button to get to the list of codes. If I read it, I likely thought there was a new setting and I could manage this "backing up" from there. Clearly this was not the case and I "consented" to let Google have all of by 2FA codes.
I remember getting tripped up by this, because I also have work credentials in there that by policy I'm not supposed to store in a synchronizing TOTP client, and Google Authenticator didn't even allow reviewing the TOTP seeds for the longest time, so this seemed like quite the departure from their previous security stance.
On iOS I use MS authenticator with backup in iCloud, I'm just too scared of losing the keys. I advise muggles to do the same.
By the way, a few days back Twitter simply decided to stop accepting my 2FA keys. Luckily I was logged-in in another browser as well where I could disable 2FA. And no it didn’t accept backup code either.
So that’s another risk with 2FAs. What I am trying to say is — 2FA synced or not synced are problematic either way.
I am also wary of passkeys! What happens if my Apple (for example) account is disabled or I am locked out of it?
An important question on this, if you don't mind:
If the phone, where Aegis was installed, is dead/lost/stolen, which options are available to make sure that access to the accounts linked to that phone wouldn't be lost either?
At that point, I might as well store the TOTP seed there and rely on its multifactor authentication – which is probably fair for many use cases, but suffers from the problem outlined by GP.
I think sites should treat TOTPs effectively equivalent to Passkeys, i.e. as maybe synced, maybe backed up, but maybe neither – and then the user needs an alternative login method, just like for all 2FA methods.
The rest are generally more sophisticated users, and are willing to risk loss of the entire account if they lose their credentials. That's the price for an overall increase in account security. From this perspective, it makes sense to provide backup codes as another tool in the DIY account-management toolbox.
These buckets oversimplify the situation, but they help explain why backup codes are offered as last-ditch authentication for 2FA.
[1]: https://support.google.com/googleone/answer/9149304?hl=en&co...
From then on I started moving my company's team and contractors (as well as family and friends) off of Google Auth and onto Aegis. The app is clean, easy to use, open source, has all the options we could dream off. (and its privacy policy isn't tens-of-pages-long like some other apps, where privacy seemed to be part of the marketing strategy but not the product itself)
I've been a very happy user.
[0]: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=35690398
[1]: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=35708869
[2]: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=37500895