Re:New Intermediate Certificates
by jcalvinowens on Tuesday March 19, 2024 @04:28PM
(#39759908)
> Not if you need to serve https traffic to clients and browsers from the same servers / same hostnames
That's what I was getting at, that makes sense to me.
> That comes from HSTS, not from cert pinning.
HSTS is a terrible half assed solution that relies on adding domains to magical predistributed lists. I wouldn't trust it if I cared enough about MITM to go to all this trouble.
> HSTS is a terrible half assed solution that relies on adding domains to magical predistributed lists. I wouldn't trust it if I cared enough about MITM to go to all this trouble.
Sure, but cert pinning in browsers is done with the same magical redistributed lists; it's just even harder to get them changed.
Not if you need to serve https traffic to clients and browsers from the same servers / same hostnames.
> If you mean preventing users from clicking through the SSL warnings in a browser if they're being MITM'd, that makes sense to me.
That comes from HSTS, not from cert pinning. Cert pinning in browsers is only available if you can convince the browser to include it in their static lists, which means you've got to be big... so that is what it is.