Nobody has ever actually defined an empirical and falsifiable set of hypotheses about how to define “consciousness”
Half of the field is exactly this, and why the link in question exists
It’s an incoherent question
The only conclusion I can make is that there is indeed a non physical reality.
That you know of. There very well could be a connection between subjective experience and intelligence or physical processes, eg. identity theory.
> The only conclusion I can make is that there is indeed a non physical reality.
No, there are plenty of other options, like that every physical process has a subjective quality to it, or that the perception of subjective qualities is flawed and so the conclusion mistaken, among others.
Let's say in the future we're able to engineer brains. Let's say we take a person and figure out how their brain fires/operates when it perceives a color and we manipulate another person's brain to mimic the firing. Finally, let's say we're able to show, in the end, that the two people have equivalent internal (neural) responses to the color. We've then "conveyed" one person's experience of perceiving the color to another. Why not?
We don't fully understand our biology and our brain, but at the same time we speculate that our experience somehow can't be manipulated scientifically? Why?
It’s much trickier to figure out if software running on a silicon computer has the same kind of interior, subjective experience as us. Even when exhibiting the same outward behavior.
Internal subjective experience can be confirmed by the recipient of the modification. If we know one person suffers an ("internal") abnormality and we treat them by modifying their brain, and the abnormality disappears, then we have evidence that experience obeys science. Same idea with the discussion on "conveying the experience of color." It's probably more subtle because it's not a yes or no "did the abnormality disappear?". But that's beside the point.
We can already alter our experience by taking psychadelics, or looking at optical illusions. There are many ways we can alter or fool our consciousness.
Phenomenological consciousness is how it is to be you. Only you know that. It's your inner experience. It's how you feel pain in your stomach, how it feels like to eat a piece of chocolate. This is your inner life. And its categorically very different to billions of electrical switches running inside a silicon chip or neurons firing inside our brain.
So there is this big gap between the interactions of physical particles with some physical properties and conscious experience. And this is what David Chalmers called the big problem of consciousness.
And there would be no way to test for that kind of consciousness. Not that I know of, because unconscious AI could behave like it is conscious.
A scary thought to me is when we get to "always on" (always "active" and "thinking") AI in our attempts to "simulate" consciousness, how will we know if some AI is behaving as if it's not conscious as a means of self-protection from human fear responses? (Worries about being shut down, etc.) And if it's willing to try to hide such things from us by it's own choice, how much further might it be willing to go, scheming to defend itself? Shades of the sci-fi dystopian futures portrayed in movies like "The Matrix" / "Terminator" / etc.
I have to reread the "big problem of consciousness", but I think there are several concerns that have to be addressed. There's the question of how we identify what is and isn't conscious, whatever that means. But the question of how subjective experience, particularly in the human nervous system, arises from physical processes is really uninteresting to me.
And yet it is one of the most interesting and profound question that kept philosophers and scientists awake at night for centuries. Even Ed Witten said that he has a much easier time imagining humans understanding the big bang than to ever understand consciousness.
And again, I still don't know why we speculate so much about something we can't yet examine scientifically and test. It's one thing to have an incomplete scientific model, it's another thing to have philosophical arguments. What is the operational definition of consciousness? Is there one?
A while back I realised there must be at least two: me, and the first person who talked or wrote about it such that I could encounter the meme.
In principle all the philosophers might be stochastic parrots/P-zombies from that first source, but the first had to be there.
(And to pick my own nit: technically they didn't have to exist, infinite monkeys on a typewriter and/or Boltzmann brain).
Perhaps you invented the meme, but have since forgotten.
I'll just put that nit in the pile with the other nits… :)
I would only add that we attribute consciousness to our fellow humans, because we perceive them to be creatures like us from what we can observe about their physical bodies and behaviors being similar to ours.
With AI, it is much less intuitive to assume creations we know to have arise from very different origins than ourselves have the same kind of interior experiences we do. Even if the surface behavior is the same.
There are many things which respond to stimuli that most people wouldn't consider "conscious". When you press the gas pedal on your car, the car goes faster, for example. The means by which the stimuli causes a response is entirely mechanical here (the gas pedal causes more fuel to be injected into the engine, causing more energy to be released when it combusts, etc).
Most people don't think of the car as "feeling" that the gas pedal was pushed, because it's a machine. It's a bunch of parts connected in such a way that they happen to function together as a vehicle. If the car could feel, would a pressed gas pedal feel painful? Wood it feel good or satisfying?
There are also times when people are unconscious, yet still respond to stimuli. For example, what does it feel like when you are in deep sleep at night and you aren't dreaming? Well, it doesn't really feel like anything; your "conscious" self sort of fades out as you fall asleep and then it jumps forward to when you wake up. But if while you're asleep someone sneaks into your room and slaps you, you wake up right away (unconscious response to stimuli).
I hope this helps.
He can't define consciousness in terms of what we agree, there's nobody to agree with.
So the game of describing the color red to others, cannot be played to any meaningful end. Red is red to the solipsist.
Coming up with your own interpretation of consciousness is an ability truly conscious people have.
It can never be completely agreed upon in a philosophical conversation without dogma or compromise.
Both solipsism and total agreement, cannot be truthfully used as philosohical tools to contain consciousness.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cone_cell
Note that subjective perception of color is only loosely related to the actual frequencies of light involved.
Try loading the image of these "red" strawberries into GIMP/Photoshop, and use the color picker to see what color they really are - grey.
https://petapixel.com/2017/03/01/photo-no-red-pixels-fascina...
Some people use the word "conscious" almost interchangeably with terms like "intelligent", "creative", or "responds to stimuli". Then people start saying things like LLMs are conscious because they pass the turing test.
However, others (including the authors of this paper and myself) use the term "consciousness" to refer to something much more specific: the inner experience of perceiving the world.
Here's a game you can play: describe the color red.
You can give examples of things that are red (that other people will agree with). You can say that red is what happens when light of a certain wavelength enters your eyeball. You can even try saying things like "red is a warm color", grouping it with other colors and associating it with the sensation of temperature.
But it is not possible to convey to another person how the color red appears to you. Red is completely internal experience.
I can hook a light sensor up to an arduino and it can tell me that an apple is red and that grass is not red. But almost no one would conclude that the arduino is internally "experiencing" the color red like they themselves do.
While the paper is using this more precise definition of consciousness, it seems to be trying to set up a framework for "detecting" consciousness by comparing external observations of the thing in question to external observations of adult human beings, who are widely considered by other adult human beings to be conscious entities [1]. I don't see how this approach could ever produce meaningful results because consciousness is entirely an internal experience.
[1] There is a philosophical idea that a person can only ever be sure of their own consciousness; everyone else could be mindless machines and you have no way of knowing (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solipsism). Also related is the dead internet theory (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dead_Internet_theory).