This argument is very well expressed in Professor Jefferson's Lister Oration for 1949, from which I quote. “Not until a machine can write a sonnet or compose a concerto because of thoughts and emotions felt, and not by the chance fall of symbols, could we agree that machine equals brain—that is, not only write it but know that it had written it. No mechanism could feel (and not merely artificially signal, an easy contrivance) pleasure at its successes, grief when its valves fuse, be warmed by flattery, be made miserable by its mistakes, be charmed by sex, be angry or depressed when it cannot get what it wants.”
This argument appears to be a denial of the validity of our test. According to the most extreme form of this view the only way by which one could be sure that a machine thinks is to be the machine and to feel oneself thinking. One could then describe these feelings to the world, but of course no one would be justified in taking any notice. Likewise according to this view the only way to know that a man thinks is to be that particular man. It is in fact the solipsist point of view. It may be the most logical view to hold but it makes communication of ideas difficult. A is liable to believe ‘A thinks but B does not’ whilst B believes ‘B thinks but A does not’. Instead of arguing continually over this point it is usual to have the polite convention that everyone thinks.
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I.—COMPUTING MACHINERY AND INTELLIGENCE
A. M. TURING
Mind, Volume LIX, Issue 236, October 1950, Pages 433–460, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/LIX.236.433
But, although it will give the impression (illusion) of feeling, it will still be running its code. Humans will have coded a fantastic illusionist, with no more emotional ability than any other tool, eg a hammer.
> According to the most extreme form of this view the only way by which one could be sure that a machine thinks is to be the machine and to feel oneself thinking.
This is true - one can only verify subjectivity in oneself. One might assume another living being does feel - but, we could be wrong - eg psychopathy can mean that others are unaware of a psychopath's "feelings" or lack of.
It does seem to me, that if we were able to code an ai that gives the impression of feelings, composes concertos apparently independently, etc, that ai would have to be a sort of psychopath.
Without getting too lost in spiritual BS, I think we are more than mere matter - the value in our experiences come from our emotions and feelings - not mere inputs that we label as 'emotions' and 'feelings' as would be the case for an ai. But emotions etc are subjective states, not objectively verifiable (even if we can see something correlating on a chart).
Put simply, ai can never have a 'soul' even if it presents a wonderful appearance of kindliness, emotionality or whatever. Perhaps there will be no test in the world that will be able to find this out. But it still won't have feelings, it can only ever be a automaton.
</sarcasm> Because humans have emotions, but not just what we 'label as emotions' but you know, 'real' emotions, not like those AI emotions.
So basically, you are arguing for a non-logic assumption that humans have souls, Machines can't, and we should just take that as gospel and move on.
I do think the materialistic idea that we are a sort of computer, with hardware (the body) and software (the mind) is a brilliant metaphor... but like any metaphor it is only so useful. Many people nowadays believe this metaphor to be literal. However, it is too mechanistic and does cannot account for subjective intangibles which is where all the value of life is, eg boredom, excitement, joy. Ie life is occurring in the experiences of the 'computer operator' in the metaphor.
Honestly the more I see from LLMs the more it makes me think that we are much the same. Imagine a network of many different LLMs each given different capabilities and prompts, each able to communicate with others. Now imagine splitting this network in half, wouldn't the resulting adjustment look similar to a split brain patient in humans? Are "you" possibly just the LLM that has been given control over the speech and other intentional body actions?
I don't see how that can be. You have no experience of anyone else subjectively. For all you know, you could be a 'brain in a jar' with inputs coming in via wires, other people could be part of the illusion. The only thing you can say you know is your own present experience - it is infinitely special. Sure, when you consider yourself objectively, you appear to be like one of so many people. But, there's no getting away from the fact your own experience is infinitely special to you. And it has meaning/value to you because of emotions. Animals seem to, but these are not at the same level. Machines give no indication of emotions. AIs appear to have emotions, but this is a simulation/illusion - like those medieval wooden toys, but better.
> I can understand people entirely different to myself so I can empathize and work with them.
This is a form of projection, imo. You have no idea about what is going on inside others. You only have appearance to guide you.
> Honestly the more I see from LLMs the more it makes me think that we are much the same.
If you take a purely objective, materialistic viewpoint, why not consider it the other way - that we ourselves are a sort of AI, our hardware being wetware/bodies - just mechanistic. Do you think you are an AI? (As was illustrated in Westworld?)
Is it "projection" to think we have insight into other minds? Sure, but if you do that projection by default then you won't think that you're special — to project like that is to be absent that thought.
> And it has meaning/value to you because of emotions. Animals seem to, but these are not at the same level. Machines give no indication of emotions. AIs appear to have emotions, but this is a simulation/illusion - like those medieval wooden toys, but better.
Likewise for this: there are many cases where humans project meaning/value onto even inanimate things, or even onto what we imagine other people might be doing — this is why "blasphemy" is a concept and not just a string of letters/phonemes, and also why people with real and violent actions to propaganda that demonises some minority or individual.
Do any AI have emotions[0], or are LLMs merely good at pretending? Both can be true at the same time (LLMs being only one of many kinds of AI), or exclusively one, or neither.
[0] regardless of if this is meant as "the qualia of emotions" or "something which has a functional influence on the network's output that is similar to the influence on human brains of hormones associated with emotions"
The fact that my experience is the only one I can experience, makes it special to me; at the same time, by default, unless and until given reason to the contrary, I project onto everyone else the same mind that I myself have.
I don't currently share ninjanomnom's opinion, but I used to: they wrote "I've never thought I was special" — as a child neither did I, but over the years I have learned this is not correct, and that I'm weird in a lot of ways. I don't experience so much disgust as others seem to, with the exception of violent horror where my disgust reaction is vastly stronger than that of society at large. I do have an extreme disinterest in spending money that means I can't even imagine regularly spending as much as €750/month combined on all the things that aren't rent/mortgage repayments. Conservatism was an alien concept until I learned about Chesterton's Fence. Back in the late 90s, I was one of about 4 kids in a school of 1000 who preferred to do maths homework than to have the afternoon off to watch the World Cup (and at that point I didn't even realise that made me weird, I thought everyone else was weird for watching it).
As a kid, I projected my thought process onto other humans, and (thanks to a teenage fling with Wicca) natural phenomena. Yes, this was an error on my part; my mum remained a believer in the supernatural for her whole life, told me she was disappointed when my (older) brother stopped believing, and I overheard her saying much the same to my partner about me when she realised I'd stopped believing.
It may well also be an error to project any kind of mind-model onto LLMs. We don't know for sure yet, because we don't know what it would take for an information processor to have qualia. (Why do I have qualia? My brain is a bag of cells sending electrochemical signals to each other). That said, I'd say there's value to interacting with them as if it were truly "like us": as they are trained on human interactions, I believe you get the most out of them by talking to them in the same way you'd talk to a human, regardless of what is or isn't going on inside.
But even though I can reason that I'm special (or at least that I'm weird), if I'm not actively thinking about it, I still default to projecting onto other humans and certain animals.