It’s almost impossible for a completely fresh design to be safer on day one. There’s so many different ways to fuck up many of them are counterintuitive because nobody ever considers if someone could install this backwards until someone does. 20+ years of debugging written with people’s lives tests just about everything in a way engineers never really think about
With training, improved systems, and redundant sensors, MCAS should be safe. There are other planes that have similar systems. And there procedures for disabling bad sensors or misbehaving sensors.
I'm not sure if MCAS is necessary, there is some indication it is only there to mimic older 737 and plane would be safe without it and with training.
Designers need to make radical changes before cockpit windows would need to be updated. That specific example may not seem like much but there’s a lot of safety critical engineering that goes into such things and yet design flaws where still uncovered.
The original 737-100 was 61,994 lbs empty and the 737-900ER was more than 50% heavier at 98,495 before they started calling them MAX. The 900ER was in many ways a radically different aircraft but got there through a long list of incremental changes leveraging the past.
That’s not to say new designs can’t be quite safe. The much newer A320 family are some of the safest aircraft flying with only 38 hull losses and 1505 fatalities, but do not mistake good design for inevitability.
It's just poor design. If software fails, then any plane should be designed to have a neutral center of gravity in order to give the crew the greatest amount of time to recover from the loss.
[1] https://spectrum.ieee.org/how-the-boeing-737-max-disaster-lo...