This isn’t about extracting encrypted data, but bypassing systems to start a car.
Don’t make the mistake of thinking that a system needs to be perfect to be worthwhile.
There's probably a body controller ECU that ties into engine ECU and driver's key systems. So theives would just generate and flash a new key/cert, that'll be certainly possible.
Infotainment? That's almost literally an aftermarket parts. American reviewers tend to see it as integral part of a car or even a central computer, surely it's important in terms of product experience but architecturally it's more like a printer over Ethernet than a laptop integrated display.
This sounds like the old desktop mentality you mentioned. You can’t just reflash things to bypass a secure boot process – the entire point is to prevent things like that! You’d design the driver’s key to pair with the various onboard systems and those systems to do a challenge-response cycle during the boot process so someone can’t easily drive away without the key or resell those parts, with both sides using a private key which never leaves that component. Yes, that kind of design can still be attacked but the goal here is to make it more expensive than it’s worth: needing a flatbed to take it somewhere for a rogue EE to work on it, for example, just isn’t going to make sense except for the most expensive luxury vehicles.
This brings me to:
> Infotainment? That's almost literally an aftermarket parts.
Yes, and those cost money. The entire point is that you don’t need to make it perfect, just expensive. If someone has to replace the display and speakers, that means they’re making less profit on the sale and making it more obvious that the vehicle was stolen which increases risk and reduces the number of buyers, especially for the most valuable vehicles.
The actual real problem I failed to explain is manufacturers don't want to deal with networked authentication, broken physical keys, or day-to-day repair shop operations, so they keep most of the processes offline and send out re-pairing tools that leaks. Very few cars require breaking chain of trust to swap out parts which makes "If they need to create a custom engine controller, ..." part unrealistic as of now. It takes few more years before Apple starts delivering cars.
It’s not the 2000s any more. Even national security agencies have trouble with phone decryption, and that suggests a path forward for cars using a tamper-resistant secure element since car thieves won’t spend more money attacking something than they can resell it for. Cars need service regularly you can have a way to replace a damaged SE which is more restricted so a legitimate owner can regain control of their stolen property - if you required, say, a government photo ID check for the owner on the title to reset the encryption keys, car thieves are highly unlikely to spend time getting high-quality fake ID since the odds of getting caught would go up dramatically, and you could deter shady auto shops by requiring them to submit proof of their ID verification for that service.