There have been a lot secure-enclave exploits against both Apple [1] and everyone else [2], and fingerprint readers can also be bypassed. The Secure Enclave itself has a giant attack surface and is highly complex. (That however does not stop dreams of "digital driver's licenses" and whatnot, though, but that's another question)
In contrast to that, ISO 7816 smartcard stuff has been in use for decades, and (unless it's Javacard...) a very limited complexity. It's rare to see something else other than sidechannel attacks.
[1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=24025502
[2] https://www.zdnet.com/article/manual-code-review-finds-35-vu...
The German AusweisApp2 is fully open-source (to protect against the first scenario), and it might be possible to do it in a web app assuming Web NFC gets more widely supported [1].
The second scenario is protected against by the keys being provisioned on the smartcard during manufacture (or, if the user so desires, at the touchpoint where they get handed over the ID card) and being unable to be exposed, at least not without either destructive methods or side-channel attacks.
[1] https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Web_NFC_API
Why bother with NFC if the phone itself has secure enclave and a biometry check to lock it down too?
And the best part of course, the federal government of US doesn't just have a standard, but actively uses all that for quite some time, just explicitly without NFC.