Code red is a standard term in emergency response that means smoke/fire. In general, in order to “redirect” that much effort one must do some paperwork to prove the urgency and immediacy of the threat.
The MO screams China to me but I wouldn’t read anything into the name “code red” which would have been selected before they identified the specific threat actor anyway.
(Sorry, so sorry, it was just too low-hanging not to to pluck: https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=W2G2sac9s34)
How exactly ?
Nothing out of the ordinary/regular infiltration, investigation and attempt to move laterally is exposed.
They had government engagements with Google's consent, and all those various engagements could be disclosed to each other?
If not, what kind of drugs were flowing at this social gathering, to cause such an orgy of bad OPSEC?
What the parent is likely referring to is: Things like "Wearing the noogler hat" or the hoops you jump through in interview (that have nothing to do with the job) are similar in spirit to some university fraternities admission processes, or are depicted as such in media.
Australians get the 'opportunity' to be part of that sort of that sort of espionage as a base level condition of citizenship [0].
As an upside, I guess it helps with encouraging good practices around zero trust processes and systems dev.
[0]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mass_surveillance_in_Australia...
Precisely. Particularly in the case of US businesses. Why bother picking a lock when you have both the key and permission?
For a nation state actor, the easiest way to accomplish that is to send one of their loyal citizens to become an employee of the target company and then have the person send back "information about the architecture, security, and management" of the target company.
Fun (but possibly apocryphal) fact: more than a decade ago in a social gathering of SREs at Google, several admitted to being on the payroll of some national intelligence bureaus.