CVE-2023-40547 – avoid incorrectly trusting HTTP headers

Re:CVE-2023-40547 – avoid incorrectly trusting HTTP headers by taeric on Thursday January 25, 2024 @06:31PM (#39136927)

If I publicly attest to something, and provide cryptographic proof that you can verify the version you are looking at is the one that I attest to, then I do not see how that is meaningfully a derivative work of what we are attesting. It is not substantial enough in size or form for it to be a derivative work. So, from that end, it seems we agree that the signature itself is not a problem.

Now, it seems what you are implying is that they need a new signature that must be created at build time. I'm asking for a much more restrictive bootloader that would have to be buildable with a repeatable process so that someone else can create the same one down to the bit level. Is this as useful as one that is not as restricted? No, but it would be a way past the legal problem?

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Re:CVE-2023-40547 – avoid incorrectly trusting HTTP headers by amluto on Thursday January 25, 2024 @07:57PM (#39137639)

> I'm asking for a much more restrictive bootloader that would have to be buildable with a repeatable process so that someone else can create the same one down to the bit level.

Reproducible builds are fantastic. But I doubt that, in this instance, it would be a valid way around the GPL.

Maybe if one, as an art project, made a project that, when compiled, had a particularly aesthetically pleasing binary representation, it would be okay. But we’re talking specifically about a signature needed to run the software, which appears to fit the definition of “Installation Information” in section 6 of the GPLv3.

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Re:CVE-2023-40547 – avoid incorrectly trusting HTTP headers by taeric on Thursday January 25, 2024 @10:48PM (#39138736)

My point is the signature can be combined after the fact. Basically, I can give you a binary that is the signature for another binary that is the boot loader, built to certain specifications. You build that, and combine with this signature, and you are good to go. If the build doesn't build exactly the same, signature will be invalid and you can't use it.

Note that this is VERY limited in how much it could possibly help. But I don't see why it wouldn't be permissible by all licenses involved. It doesn't require the signing key, but a valid signature. For that device, it is locked down enough that the only installer that can work is the one that matches this signature. If installing somewhere else, you don't need the signature anymore, and can make your own or use an unsigned loader.

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