>are not part of the source code, and therefore the GPL isn't concerned with them.

IIRC the GPL concerns itself with buildscripts etc. and GPLv3 was written with the tivoization of v2 in mind.

https://www.gnu.org/licenses/quick-guide-gplv3.html

>Protecting Your Right to Tinker

>Tivoization is a dangerous attempt to curtail users' freedom: the right to modify your software will become meaningless if none of your computers let you do it. GPLv3 stops tivoization by requiring the distributor to provide you with whatever information or data is necessary to install modified software on the device. This may be as simple as a set of instructions, or it may include special data such as cryptographic keys or information about how to bypass an integrity check in the hardware. It will depend on how the hardware was designed—but no matter what information you need, you must be able to get it.

>This requirement is limited in scope. Distributors are still allowed to use cryptographic keys for any purpose, and they'll only be required to disclose a key if you need it to modify GPLed software on the device they gave you.

> Code submitted for UEFI signing must not be subject to GPLv3 or any license that purports to give someone the right to demand authorization keys to be able to install modified forms of the code on a device. Code that is subject to such a license that has already been signed might have that signature revoked. For example, GRUB 2 is licensed under GPLv3 and will not be signed.

It does according to MSFT lawyers: https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/hardware-dev-center/u...

> any license that purports to give someone the right to demand authorization keys to be able to install modified forms of the code on a device

There's nowhere in the GPLv3 that says that (then again, that sentence doesn't imply there is). Anyone can download and modify the grub source code, and compile it. It doesn't mean Microsoft is obliged to sign their fork. I wonder if there's something that confused (or was bad faith interpreted) by Microsoft's lawyers?

Maybe someone can just use another open source license? Ie, anything not called 'GPLv3' which, like every other OSS license, does not purport to give someone the right to demand authorization keys to be able to install modified forms of the code on a device.

> There's nowhere in the GPLv3 that says that (then again, that sentence doesn't imply there is)

It does, commonly called the anti-tivoization clause. Here's the text:

> “Installation Information” for a User Product means any methods, procedures, authorization keys, or other information required to install and execute modified versions of a covered work in that User Product from a modified version of its Corresponding Source. The information must suffice to ensure that the continued functioning of the modified object code is in no case prevented or interfered with solely because modification has been made.

> If you convey an object code work under this section in, or with, or specifically for use in, a User Product, and the conveying occurs as part of a transaction in which the right of possession and use of the User Product is transferred to the recipient in perpetuity or for a fixed term (regardless of how the transaction is characterized), the Corresponding Source conveyed under this section must be accompanied by the Installation Information. But this requirement does not apply if neither you nor any third party retains the ability to install modified object code on the User Product (for example, the work has been installed in ROM).

> The requirement to provide Installation Information does not include a requirement to continue to provide support service, warranty, or updates for a work that has been modified or installed by the recipient, or for the User Product in which it has been modified or installed. Access to a network may be denied when the modification itself materially and adversely affects the operation of the network or violates the rules and protocols for communication across the network.

> Corresponding Source conveyed, and Installation Information provided, in accord with this section must be in a format that is publicly documented (and with an implementation available to the public in source code form), and must require no special password or key for unpacking, reading or copying.

From GPLv3, section 6. Conveying Non-Source Forms.

> [...] any methods, procedures, authorization keys, or other information required to install and execute modified versions of a covered work [...]

From what I understand, allowing the user to install their own trusted keys is enough; there's no need to allow users to sign with the "official" trusted key as long as that alternative exists.

I suspect that Microsoft's worry is that they don't control the firmware (the motherboard manufacturers do), and some UEFI firmware might be broken and not allow installing alternative trusted keys. I believe shim solves this by adding an intermediate layer which also allows the user to manually install their own trusted keys, even if the firmware doesn't.

You're correct. See my response to the other poster. https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=39133890

They're probably referring to this part of the GPLv3 license:

> “Installation Information” for a User Product means any methods, procedures, authorization keys, or other information required to install and execute modified versions of a covered work in that User Product from a modified version of its Corresponding Source. The information must suffice to ensure that the continued functioning of the modified object code is in no case prevented or interfered with solely because modification has been made.

> If you convey an object code work under this section in, or with, or specifically for use in, a User Product, and the conveying occurs as part of a transaction in which the right of possession and use of the User Product is transferred to the recipient in perpetuity or for a fixed term (regardless of how the transaction is characterized), the Corresponding Source conveyed under this section must be accompanied by the Installation Information. But this requirement does not apply if neither you nor any third party retains the ability to install modified object code on the User Product (for example, the work has been installed in ROM).

I believe the MSFT lawyers are right here, but obviously I'm not a lawyer.

Thanks! I was looking for the word 'sign' and couldn't find it.

I now think I was wrong earlier.

Summarizing https://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-3.0.html:

> The information (ie 'methods, procedures, authorization keys, or other information required to install and execute modified versions of a covered work') must suffice to ensure that the continued functioning of the modified object code is in no case prevented or interfered with solely because modification has been made.

The purpose of allowing signing is exactly to ensure modified code does not function in that environment.

Yes MS (and you) would be right. GPLv2, BSD or MIT would be fine but GPLv3 would not.

-----------------------------------

Edit reply to baobun (rate limit means I can't post)

I did think about that, but:

> continued functioning of the modified object code

is vague. Does it mean a new firmware binary should continue working on the same device as the unmodified predecessor or using is a new device (that allows arbitrary entities to sign) considered to be "continued functioning"?

Not exactly. AshamedCaptain gets it. If the device can be configured to trust a user-supplied key instead of or in addition to Microsoft's, there is no need to provide any keys. This is up to the hardware supplier.

https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=39134059

https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=39133999

I did reply to this, but had to reply in my existing comment above due to the rate limit.

Actually, if you ask the Software Freedom Conservancy, not only is this a requirement of the GPLv3, it is in fact also required by the GPLv2 [0]:

> GPLv2 assures, to the purchaser of an embedded product, their absolute right to receive the information necessary to install a modified version of the GPLv2'd works. [...] installation of the GPL'd works must succeed and operate in a useful and functional fashion on the device.

I believe the FSF position is different, but it's unclear. At least one member of the SFC who was a member of the FSF in the past (Bradley Kuhn) [1] believes that the FSF has the same position - that both GPLv2 software and GPLv3 software must be accompanied by full instructions (and ability) for a user to install their own modified versions on any hardware containing this software. He believes that the only difference with GPLv3 is that, in addition to this requirement, other proprietary software on the device must continue to operate just as before; whereas, with the GPLv2, it's fine for other proprietary software to say "you're running an unsigned version of Linux, failing to start". Linus Torvalds' public statements about the GPLv3, as well as the FSF page on Tivoization [2], seem to suggest otherwise.

Either way, this is not some invention of MS lawyers meant to make the GPL look scarier, it is very much how the free software community sees the GPL working.

[0] https://sfconservancy.org/blog/2021/mar/25/install-gplv2/

[1] https://sfconservancy.org/blog/2021/jul/23/tivoization-and-t...

[2] https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/tivoization.en.html

So... really no. The overall spirit of the GPLv3 text is that the license demands preservation of the ability of an end user to modify and run the software they receive, see all the discussion at the time it was being drafted about "TiVoization". It does not specifically speak to encryption and signatures being used by the loader environment, but it's absolutely reasonable to interpret it that way.

If I buy a laptop from Lenovo, and it uses a signed GPLv3 bootloader, and I want to modify and run a new version of that bootloader, I'm prevented by the lack of a signature. That action is exactly what the license demands Lenovo permit.

Now, obviously this collides badly with the security requirements of the system. So it's likewise totally reasonable to imagine a court flipping the other way and refusing to literally enforce the GPLv3 because of the potential damage to the market. But if that happens, then what gives Lenovo any right to ship that GPLv3 software at all? Now they're subject to the bootloader authors demanding they stop shipment of the infringing product.

No, the permissively-licensed shim compromise was the right choice.

> No, the permissively-licensed shim compromise was the right choice.

Why? Why on earth?

IF Lenovo wanted to really ship a GPLv3 bootloader, all it imposes on Lenovo is they ship a method to install your own bootloader keys. Do you really disagree with that?

Lenovo has already shipped hardware which requires magical incantations to install anything other than Windows (see Secured Core hardware). Why on earth anyone shipping FLOSS software would drop their pants to allow precisely this shitshow is over me.

I'm not the person you should be arguing with. I didn't write the license and I'm not the judge that would have to make the decision. I was explaining why the collision between software freedom and end user security requirements (which is a very real thing!) is seen as a risk to the people shipping and supporting actual hardware.

There is no collision _whatsoever_ between software freedom and security requirements. It's an illusion which happens to be highly convenient to those who want to promote an artificially controlled market and sell that as snake-oil security.