News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:OpenBSD KDE Plasma Desktop by radiator on Monday January 08, 2024 @02:22PM (#38916754)
Besides firefox, more than 80 userland programs have their access to the filesystem restricted with the use of unveil.
Re:OpenBSD KDE Plasma Desktop by PrimeMcFly on Monday January 08, 2024 @04:29PM (#38918432)
If Theo stopped being so resistant to solutions like AppArmor, then OpenBSD could have a real security layer instead of toys like unveil and pledge.
Re:OpenBSD KDE Plasma Desktop by thewanderer1983 on Monday January 08, 2024 @08:02PM (#38920857)
Here is Justine's write up on pledge and why he wants to port it to Linux. https://justine.lol/pledge/
Re:OpenBSD KDE Plasma Desktop by PrimeMcFly on Monday January 08, 2024 @08:21PM (#38921010)
It has its uses I guess, but it requires opt-in which is a pretty big disadvantage, and then still can't do even a fraction of what SELinux can already do. SELinux isn't that hard to learn, and the security benefits are immense.
Re:OpenBSD KDE Plasma Desktop by okasaki on Monday January 08, 2024 @05:36PM (#38919298)

    2024-01-08 22:34 ubuntu@knope:~$ sudo apparmor_status
    apparmor module is loaded.
    185 profiles are loaded.
    104 profiles are in enforce mode.
    (...)
    124 processes have profiles defined.
    122 processes are in enforce mode.

including firefox and chromium
Re:OpenBSD KDE Plasma Desktop by artsi0m on Tuesday January 09, 2024 @07:35AM (#38925413)
But apparmor is more complex system and in fact is an RBAC. unveil(2) is much more easier in implementation and enforcing.