The FAA sent around an Emergency Airworthiness Directive reiterating the two step process before the EA crash:
Boeing Emergency Airworthiness Directive
"Initially, higher control forces may be needed to overcome any stabilizer nose down trim already applied. Electric stabilizer trim can be used to neutralize control column pitch forces before moving the STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches to CUTOUT. Manual stabilizer trim can be used before and after the STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches are moved to CUTOUT."
https://theaircurrent.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/B737-MA...
They also ignored the overspeed warning horn because they were apparently operating at full throttle. This was a large contributory factor to being unable to move the trim by hand.
So, yeah, it is harsh to the crews. I've also talked with MAX pilots who were quite harsh towards them. I'm amazed that one would not be harsh towards a pilot who did not bother to read/understand/remember and EMERGENCY AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE about how not to crash.
Would you get on an airplane knowing it had such a pilot? Not me.
I assign 50% responsibility to the pilots and 50% to Boeing.
Also, before the LA crash, the MCAS failure happened on the previous flight of the same aircraft, and the crew just turned off the stab trim, and continued the flight normally and landed safely. That crew was unaware of MCAS, but they followed standard runaway trim emergency procedure.
Of course, the MCAS software was badly designed, and the single path failure, are squarely Boeing's fault.
Pilots must always be ready to deal with runaway stabilizer trim, on any aircraft type. It's a "memory item".
This is flatly wrong. The only aerodynamically unstable planes are experimental and some fighter jets.
No passenger plane can be certified if it can't be proven that it is aerodynamically stable.
EDIT: don't take my word, here is a short explanation by a 777 pilot: https://youtu.be/EuVlbVr_jrs?feature=shared&t=129
Look up dutch roll, the active yaw damper that suppresses it, and the FAA requirement that all of them have a yaw damper installed.
Besides, the MAX is not unstable. All it was supposed to do was just nudge the nose down a bit to match the profile of the previous 737 jets.
>Besides, the MAX is not unstable.
You might want to address your seeming hypocrisy there.
Stability is also commonly understood as the opposite of maneuverability, as a more stable aircraft is less maneuverable.
Combat aircraft such as fighters are designed to be aerodynamically unstable so their maneuverability is unhindered. Likewise stunt planes and other aircraft whose job is to not fly straight and level.
Aircraft such as passenger and cargo airliners are designed to be aerodynamically stable because their job is to fly straight and level with good fuel economy and minimal piloting, they do not need swift and nimble maneuverability.
The safety of an aircraft has no relation to that aircraft's aerodynamic stability.
An airliner has to perform well at both, which is why wings are swept, yet have flaps and slats to modify their aerodynamic profile. Swept wings have other problems, like dutch roll.
Airliners also become uncontrollable above a certain speed, which was a contributing factor to the EA crash (the crew ignored the overspeed warning).
Indeed there is no requirement for aircraft with the same training / type certificate to handle identically. For example the whole CitationJet class from the Mustang to the CJ4.
All jet airliners are aerodynamically unstable and use active controls to "paper over" that. There is nothing inherently wrong with doing that.
The MCAS problem was not due to its purpose. The problem was the software for it had too much authority, and did not shut off when the pilot countermanded it. A worse problem was the pilots did not follow emergency procedures for runaway trim.
For reference, the emergency procedures are:
1. restore normal trim with the electric trim switches (which overrides MCAS)
2. turn off the trim via a switch on the console