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Re:Systemd through the eyes of a musl distribution maintainer by sevagh on Saturday January 06, 2024 @08:59AM (#38891482)
>"systemd runs services as independent users, it solves that!"

It's in a terrible way, too. Not sure it improved but I recall somebody once, at a company I worked at, trying to introduce per-unix-user systemd services (e.g. `graphite` user for running Graphite), and there were some atrocious steps required like `loginctl --enable-linger` and God knows what.

We moved to running everything systemd as root, it's easier (and you can specify which unixuser the actual systemd unit runs at, which is "close enough").

Re:Systemd through the eyes of a musl distribution maintainer by Nullabillity on Saturday January 06, 2024 @09:51AM (#38891850)
Loginctl/per-user systemds are for managing interactive sessions. System services with User= is exactly the way you'd go for isolating background daemons.
Re:Systemd through the eyes of a musl distribution maintainer by ptx on Saturday January 06, 2024 @11:03AM (#38892503)
What if you want to let a non-root user manage the systemd unit for a particular service? Is there a better way than per-user systemd instances?
Re:Systemd through the eyes of a musl distribution maintainer by acdha on Saturday January 06, 2024 @11:27AM (#38892730)
Check example 3.4 here for a polkit policy allowing an arbitrary user to restart a single unit:

https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Polkit

Re:Systemd through the eyes of a musl distribution maintainer by twic on Saturday January 06, 2024 @12:52PM (#38893478)
Does this let them modify the unit file, create units, create timers, etc?

User systemd allows that kind of complete self-service, and so lets you do application deployment and management without touching the root account, which is rather nice.

Re:Systemd through the eyes of a musl distribution maintainer by BenjiWiebe on Saturday January 06, 2024 @07:36PM (#38897108)
If they can edit a service that runs with more privileges than they have, that's a privilege escalation vulnerability.

Polkit lets a non-root user restart a root/privileged service without letting the non-root user gain privileges.

Re:Systemd through the eyes of a musl distribution maintainer by chuckadams on Saturday January 06, 2024 @11:13AM (#38892591)
chgrp, setfacl, sudo.conf ... lots of choices.