In other words, the installation location doesn't really matter. If the process is breached, the user context is f#cked regardless.
If a Firefox exploit drops an exe, it will never run with admin rights. It'd have to be coming from Mozilla and signed by Mozilla. Plus, it'd have to come from their servers, because you can't just drop the exe and have it installed, the updater only trust what it downloads on it's own.
[1]: https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Reviews/Firefox10/SilentUp....
[2]: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=544442#c24
Why the downvotes? As the other comment points out this is a really stupid security bit to nitpick as all of the alternatives are equally vulnerable in an equally contrivable scenario manner. One way or another privileges have to be granted. They can be granted in one place or another and have largely similar if not identical implications at the very least in terms of the net effect that can be had.
Since Chrome is in the user area, guess what, anything compromising Chrome can overwrite Chrome itself. It can then prompt you with UAC or simply have a user space trojan. (heh, and it can't compromise Firefox if it's also installed)
An updater has a several magnitudes less code to audit (thousand, millions magnitudes?).
In Firefox's case, if Firefox is compromised, it cannot modify itself (heh, it can compromise Chrome if it's also installed)