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Re:Colliding Secure Hashes by brohee on Friday December 22, 2023 @05:44AM (#38732950)
He demonstrates without a doubt that 128 bit of hash is not enough, yet you can still find many projects still publishing MD5 hashes. The long tail of bad crypto is extremely long.
Re:Colliding Secure Hashes by AlexSW on Friday December 22, 2023 @06:47AM (#38733266)
As always, it depends what properties you're relying on MD5 for. Just because something uses MS5 doesn't mean it's broken, because its preimage resistance (i.e. 'invert this hash') and second preimage resistance (i.e. 'find an input that goes to the same hash of this other input') are both not broken (yet) from a practical perspective.

Sometimes whether a cryptographic protocol relies on collision resistance can be surprisingly nuanced, so it should be phased out for this alone (and as we have better options) but for simple examples (e.g. to make a signed hash of an executable, which is probably equivalent to what you're describing) it's not broken.

Re:Colliding Secure Hashes by Joker_vD on Friday December 22, 2023 @08:23AM (#38733877)
Or you can just use SHA-256 instead and not bother with subtle details about which uses are safe and which are not.
Re:Colliding Secure Hashes by forward1 on Friday December 22, 2023 @10:51AM (#38735263)
Or you can't, for example because you already signed a 20 year root with SHA-1. Nor does it matter in this example and many others.
Re:Colliding Secure Hashes by postalrat on Friday December 22, 2023 @10:06AM (#38734817)
And blindly use a suggestion from hn without understanding the tradeoffs.
Re:Colliding Secure Hashes by mr_mitm on Friday December 22, 2023 @08:34AM (#38733971)
Still depends. Using SHA-256 for password storage is bad. Argon2 would be a much safer bet. Or maybe scrypt or yescrypt.
Re:Colliding Secure Hashes by brohee on Friday December 22, 2023 @07:56AM (#38733658)
They often propose verifying downloads with it, and it's pretty easy for a project insider to build two artifacts with the same MD5, one clean and one not...
Re:Colliding Secure Hashes by ForkMeOnTinder on Friday December 22, 2023 @08:10AM (#38733764)
Aren't you already trusting the maintainer by downloading and running their software? An evil maintainer can publish any hash they want, so why would they go to the trouble of making a hash collision?
Re:Colliding Secure Hashes by chrisshroba on Friday December 22, 2023 @10:07AM (#38734829)
That’s what I always wonder too. If we assume an attacker can change the contents at example.com/app.zip, why should we assume the hash published at example.com/download.html is any more secure?
Re:Colliding Secure Hashes by Kalium on Friday December 22, 2023 @10:22AM (#38734961)
In some setups, you're required to trust both the maintainer and the mirror, which are not always the same party. If someone can generate a collision, it means a mirror can mount an attack even when the maintainer is corrected trusted.
Re:Colliding Secure Hashes by o11c on Friday December 22, 2023 @11:25AM (#38735679)
No, that would require second preimage.
Re:Colliding Secure Hashes by brohee on Friday December 22, 2023 @10:42AM (#38735163)
You can pass review that way. You publish a clean artifact that gets reviewed and vetted, and for the actual attack you replace the vetted artifact by the bad one. If you trust MD5, or as the article shows, even a good 128 bit hash, like truncated SHA-256, you get pwned. That's why you don't accept MD5 based signature as well.

People that take security seriously enough to check hashes should not trust MD5 so the scenario is not super credible, but people still publish MD5 hashed like it's the early 2000s.

Re:Colliding Secure Hashes by saagarjha on Friday December 22, 2023 @08:07AM (#38733746)
Depends on what the artifact is.
Re:Colliding Secure Hashes by upofadown on Friday December 22, 2023 @06:52AM (#38733291)
Technically, a software project does not have to worry about collisions for hashes verifying their releases. That only becomes a problem where there is some sort of trusted third party that can be tricked into authenticating one of a pair of collided hashes.

There is a usability issue here. A 256 bit hash is so long as to be very hard to manually compare. A project might want to keep the length down to something reasonable.

Re:Colliding Secure Hashes by zcw100 on Friday December 22, 2023 @09:14AM (#38734293)
Or find ways to easily compare them without doing it manually.
Re:Colliding Secure Hashes by Vecr on Friday December 22, 2023 @05:26PM (#38739349)
Chopping (drop the first x bits) sha256 to 180 bits is probably the most secure way to go, see Block-Cipher-Based Tree Hashing by Aldo Gunsing. Bitcoin uses RIPEMD180 so the length is probably fine, but it has other properties that make chopped sha256 a better idea (length extension attacks for example).
Re:Colliding Secure Hashes by Retr0id on Friday December 22, 2023 @05:50AM (#38732970)
MD5 is also broken for much worse reasons than only being 128 bits long, you can generate collisions near instantly
Re:Colliding Secure Hashes by hedora on Friday December 22, 2023 @11:39AM (#38735841)
Not really. He generated some partially colliding 96 bit hashes, then threw away non-matching characters, and claimed to have a collision.

If you let me pick which bits matter for collision detection, then I can make any secure hash collide with itself.

On a related note, someone took the end of Contact to heart, and definitively proved that God is a Where's Waldo? fan:

https://kundor.github.io/Finding-Waldo/

Re:Colliding Secure Hashes by Retr0id on Saturday December 23, 2023 @02:34PM (#38747345)
I never threw away any non-matching characters, it's a full 96-bit collision, period.
Re:Colliding Secure Hashes by CodesInChaos on Friday December 22, 2023 @11:49AM (#38735953)
Unless the attacker has a big influence on the "good" binary, they need to find a second pre-image, not a collision for this to be a problem. The real problems with publishing hashes is that the source of the hash is generally just as (un)trustworthy as the binary itself, and that nobody bothers verifying them in the first place.