Put another way: what matters is that the attacker can get arbitrary code to run on your machine, not that they can unload arbitrary package-shaped things to a publicly accessible package index. The former can be solved; the latter isn’t solvable in the general case.
As always, the most secure system is the system that doesn't exist. Every other security argument has to contend with our desire to do useful stuff, and therefore it has to begin with a credible attack vector. Not just a hunch or some notion that it's "security best practice".
I feel that the differentiation between "lifting keys" and "maliciously using them" is not a useful one to make. Both actions are very bad. If you want to wait until we have evidence that the compromised keys were used to pull e.g. proprietary code or configuration from Github; why not also wait until that compromised data is sold? Or until a company is formed leveraging it? Ultimately, it's a slippery slope of "nothing will satisfy you", and there's clearly a genesis event here that is reprehensible and should be known about, even if it is, as you say, just opportunistic script kiddies.
Speaking of which; I loath that characterization of threat actors. This is not the 90s anymore, and it's time to grow up and recognize that the opponents in this space can be extremely sophisticated and well-funded. This is, genuinely, something that many people in the industry refuse to accept; because it implies that we absolutely need to hold ourselves and our work to a higher standard, treat what we produce with severe gravity, and ultimately this means the pace of innovation will slow down and we'll need to ask the mirror serious questions like "wait, so you just, npm installed critical code that was handling sensitive user data? without even auditing it?"
NPM (and, by extension, Github) are extremely blame-worthy here. Reports like this one absolutely happen so Sonatype can sell their product; no doubt on that coming from me whatsoever. But, they also put pressure on key infrastructure providers.
> FTA, the “rapid evolution” in question is that the malicious packages switched from using base64 for obfuscation to…double base64.
Ok, yeah; describing that as "rapid evolution" is overselling it. But let's play in that playground; it's not a rapid evolution, it's an unsophisticated additional layer of easily-reversible obfuscation, which npm did not catch. Why? Why is sonatype catching this, and not npm?
You misunderstood: the differentiation was between malicious packages being uploaded and actually being used, not between the keys being stolen and being used. I agree that the latter would not be a useful or productive distinction to make.
To be clear: supply chain security is serious, and there are sophisticated (organized crime, nation state) actors in the space. But that isn’t what this is; the lack of sophistication makes that clear.
It’s true that indices could probably be doing more to stop this kind of stuff, and many are; see the adjacent comment by ‘SethMLarson.
It feels like we're constantly getting closer to this. We've been mostly able to do this in the browser for years now.
I continue to have high hopes for non-browser WebAssembly. I really, really want to be able to run Python, JavaScript, Rust code etc on my phone and laptop inside a WebAssembly sandbox that tightly limits the filesystem, network, memory and CPU access of that code.
I'm seeing glimpses of this being possible - https://til.simonwillison.net/webassembly/python-in-a-wasm-s... and https://til.simonwillison.net/deno/pyodide-sandbox for example - but it's still not as easy as I want it to be.
Everything else feels like trying to patch over the shaky security foundations with just one more abstraction.
Firecracker is the best I've seen in terms of container security - it was designed by AWS for Lambda and is trusted by people I trust. It's not really packaged for easily running on macOS etc though.
I want a sandbox that's robust, widely used and widely tested. WebAssembly feels like it should be the best possible option.
If you have a better idea for a sandbox I can use to run untrusted code on my laptop (and phone) I'd love to hear what it is!
Use KVM if you're on Linux/Android. It's not about the binaries but where and how it's running, there is 0 isolation in WASM alone, and creating a new runtime to run it outside of browsers will not give you what you're looking for.
Android recently announced they're going the KVM route.
Pyodide provides one that works well for Python.
I'm finding it surprisingly hard to find a good option for JavaScript. QuickJS or one of its forks might work but I've not yet figured out the incantations necessary to do that.
Then there's Lua, Ruby, PHP, etc - ideally I'd like there to be robust, well maintained, well documented WebAssembly versions of any language that I might want to run code from.
It’s more the language of compromise I resent: I think treating every low-effort malicious spam package as a fundamental risk unnecessarily “spends” the security mindshare budget that engineers keep in reserve. But I think my opinions there are already well-known :-)
Removing malware from the index is a laudable goal, but the language of threats, attacks, thefts, etc. is essentially unsubstantiated: there’s no evidence that this goes beyond opportunistic, untargeted script kiddy behavior.
Edit: FTA, the “rapid evolution” in question is that the malicious packages switched from using base64 for obfuscation to…double base64.